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THE PATH OUT OF WASHINGTON’S TAKINGS 
QUAGMIRE: THE CASE FOR ADOPTING THE FEDERAL 
TAKINGS ANALYSIS 
Roger D. Wynne 
Abstract: A quagmire awaits anyone attempting to understand the analysis Washington 
courts employ to determine whether government action constitutes a “taking” of property for 
which compensation is due under the U.S. Constitution. The Washington takings analysis is 
complex and confounding, especially when compared to the relatively straightforward 
takings analysis established by the U.S. Supreme Court. This Article argues that the 
Washington State Supreme Court should reject the Washington takings analysis and adopt 
the federal analysis. Comparing the federal and Washington analyses underscores how, as a 
matter of form, the Washington analysis easily stymies those who must work with it. 
Substantively, the Washington analysis is unfounded on three key levels: (1) the existence of 
differences between the two analyses fatally undermines the Washington analysis; (2) the 
nature of those differences renders the Washington analysis constitutionally insufficient by 
lowering the floor of protection that property owners enjoy under the federal analysis; and 
(3) the differences do not enhance the federal analysis. Rejecting the Washington takings 
analysis in favor of the federal analysis would be consistent with the doctrine of stare decisis 
because the Washington State Supreme Court originally intended to harmonize Washington 
and federal takings law, even though the Court failed to implement that intent. When 
embracing the federal takings analysis, the Court should avoid mischaracterizations of the 
federal takings analysis and the temptation to justify the Washington analysis on independent 
state constitutional grounds for the first time. 
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INTRODUCTION 
In 1990, the Washington State Supreme Court breathed a sigh of 
relief. Looking back, the Court lamented the “quagmire” into which 
Washington and federal courts had wandered when analyzing claims that 
government regulation constituted a taking of private property for which 
compensation was due:
1
 
The “tests” for over-regulation have until recently proved 
somewhat of a quagmire of constitutional theory vacillating 
between substantive due process and “takings” theory. Both this 
court and the United States Supreme Court have in the past 
struggled with the difficult determination of where a mere 
regulation ends and a “taking” commences.
2
 
Looking ahead, however, the Court expressed confidence that it had 
found a path out of the quagmire through a comprehensive takings 
analysis harmonizing Washington and federal takings law.
3
 Although the 
                                                      
1. As interpreted by federal courts, the U.S. Constitution prohibits the taking of private property 
by the government, whether through regulation or physical appropriation, without compensation. 
U.S. CONST. amend. V. See Lingle v. Chevron U.S.A., Inc., 544 U.S. 528, 537–38 (2005). The 
Washington State Supreme Court reads the parallel provision in the Washington Constitution, 
WASH. CONST. art. I, § 16, as providing the “same right.” Sintra v. City of Seattle (Sintra I), 119 
Wash. 2d 1, 13, 829 P.2d 765, 772 (1992); Orion Corp. v. State, 109 Wash. 2d 621, 657, 747 P.2d 
1062, 1082 (1987) (“[T]he breadth of constitutional protection under the state and federal just 
compensation clauses remains virtually identical.”). 
2. Presbytery of Seattle v. King Cnty., 114 Wash. 2d 320, 328, 787 P.2d 907, 911 (1990). 
3. Id. at 329–37, 787 P.2d at 912–16. As used in this Article, a “takings analysis” comprises the 
series of questions or tests a court employs to determine whether a taking has occurred. 
021911WDR Wynne Post DTP Post Final Author Read.docx (Do Not Delete) 21/02/2011  04:40 
128 WASHINGTON LAW REVIEW [Vol. 86:125 
 
Court refined this analysis through 1993, the Court never questioned its 
1990 pronouncement that its takings analysis delivered Washington from 
the takings quagmire. 
The Court’s confidence has proved unwarranted. Washington remains 
mired in a cumbersome, confusing, and constitutionally suspect takings 
analysis. The Court should extricate Washington from this situation by 
adopting the federal takings analysis. 
Part I of this Article compares the straightforward federal takings 
analysis with Washington’s complex and disjointed takings analysis. 
Part II explains how the Washington takings analysis is unfounded on 
three key levels: (1) it is fatally undermined by the fact that it differs 
from the analysis established by the U.S. Supreme Court; (2) the nature 
of those differences renders the Washington analysis constitutionally 
insufficient by lowering the floor of protection that property owners 
enjoy under the federal takings analysis; and (3) the differences do not 
improve the federal analysis. Part III demonstrates how overruling 
Washington’s takings case law would be consistent with the doctrine of 
stare decisis, and cautions the Washington State Supreme Court to avoid 
mischaracterizations of the federal takings analysis and the temptation to 
justify the Washington analysis on independent state constitutional 
grounds for the first time.
4
 
                                                      
4. This Article focuses on claims that government action, most often in the form of a regulation, 
constitutes a “taking” within the meaning of constitutional protections. This Article excludes at least 
four related but conceptually distinct claims: 
1.  No public purpose or use. A property owner may assert that the government lacks the 
authority to take property, even if compensated, because the taking is not for a “public 
purpose” or “public use” within the meaning of the federal or Washington takings 
jurisprudence. This Article discusses that type of claim only to distinguish it from the type of 
claim at issue in this Article. See infra text accompanying notes 276–78. 
2.  Physical exactions. In an “exaction” claim, the issue is whether the government, instead 
of paying for a physical easement, may demand or “exact” it as a condition of granting a land 
use permit sought by the claimant. A court cannot address an “exaction” claim until the court 
has already concluded that the government has taken property or proposes to take it. See 
generally Lingle, 544 U.S. 528, 546–47. 
3.  Monetary exactions. Whether a government-imposed fee or charge constitutes a taking is 
subject to an analysis different from the analysis used to assess whether the government has 
taken real property. See Dean v. Lehman, 143 Wash. 2d 12, 31–32, 18 P.3d 523, 533–34 
(2001) (“[I]f a charge is ‘reasonably related’ to either a benefit provided to, or a burden 
produced by, a particular citizen it is not a taking.”). 
4.  Damage. Unlike the Federal Takings Clause, the Washington takings clause adds that 
property may not be “damaged” without compensation. WASH. CONST. art. I, § 16. For a 
discussion of the potential significance of that addition, see infra text accompanying notes 
300–01. 
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I. THE WASHINGTON TAKINGS ANALYSIS IS MORE 
COMPLEX AND CONFOUNDING THAN THE FEDERAL 
TAKINGS ANALYSIS 
Stark differences exist between the analyses federal and Washington 
courts apply to a takings claim brought under the U.S. Constitution. 
Federal courts employ a straightforward, three-part analysis. Washington 
courts, by contrast, use the three parts of the federal takings analysis, 
plus three unique elements arranged in a complex series of questions and 
sub-questions. Washington takings case law is confusing and often 
difficult to reconcile. The result is a quagmire that vexes attorneys and 
judges alike. 
A. The Federal Takings Analysis Is Relatively Simple and Omits Due 
Process Considerations 
Key to understanding the evolution and current form of the federal 
takings analysis is the distinction between the federal Due Process and 
Takings Clauses. The Due Process Clause that regulates state action is in 
the Fourteenth Amendment to the U.S. Constitution and provides: 
“[N]or shall any State deprive any person of life, liberty, or property, 
without due process of law.”
5
 The constitutional remedy for government 
action that violates this prohibition is the invalidation of the action, not 
the payment of compensation.
6
 By contrast, the Takings Clause is in the 
Fifth Amendment and states: “[N]or shall private property be taken for 
public use, without just compensation.”
7
 The remedy for a violation of 
this prohibition is the payment of compensation, not the invalidation of 
the action.
8
 The U.S. Supreme Court struggled for a period of decades to 
keep these two provisions analytically distinct. 
                                                      
5. U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1. 
6. Orion Corp. v. State, 109 Wash. 2d 621, 649, 747 P.2d 1062, 1077 (1987). A statutory right to 
compensation may be available where government action violates due process protections. See 42 
U.S.C. § 1983 (2006). See, e.g., Sintra, Inc. v. City of Seattle (Sintra II), 131 Wash. 2d 640, 651–54, 
935 P.2d 555, 561–64 (1997) (discussing the availability of this statutory remedy in Washington 
courts). As a purely constitutional matter, however, the remedy is injunctive. 
7. U.S. CONST. amend. V; Dolan v. City of Tigard, 512 U.S. 374, 383 (1994) (“The Takings 
Clause of the Fifth Amendment of the United States Constitution [is] made applicable to the States 
through the Fourteenth Amendment . . . .”).  
8. Orion, 109 Wash. 2d at 649, 747 P.2d at 1077; see also First English Evangelical Lutheran 
Church of Glendale v. Cnty. of L.A., 482 U.S. 304, 314 (1987) (“As its language indicates, and as 
the Court has frequently noted, this provision does not prohibit the taking of private property, but 
instead places a condition on the exercise of that power.”).  
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The U.S. Supreme Court initially acknowledged the distinction 
between the Due Process and Takings Clauses in Nectow v. City of 
Cambridge.
9
 Challenging the constitutionality of a new zoning 
ordinance that limited the uses he could make of his land, the property 
owner in Nectow did not allege a violation of the Takings Clause, but of 
his due process rights.
10
 He did not seek compensation; he sought to 
relieve his property from the newly imposed use limitations.
11
 The Court 
ruled in his favor. Using a substantive due process test that remains 
largely unchanged today, the Court ruled that a zoning ordinance 
“cannot be imposed if it does not bear a substantial relation to the public 
health, safety, morals, or general welfare.”
12
 Because the Court found 
that the use limitations placed on the property by the zoning ordinance in 
Nectow did not bear a substantial relation to the public health, safety, 
morals, or general welfare, the Court ruled that the ordinance violated 
the Due Process Clause.
13
 As the property owner requested, the remedy 
in Nectow was not compensation, but freeing the property from the use 
limitation.
14
 
Fifty years later, in 1980, the U.S. Supreme Court overlooked this 
distinction and conflated due process and takings law. In Agins v. City of 
Tiburon,
15
 property owners alleged that a local zoning ordinance 
effected a taking under the Fifth Amendment, not a violation of due 
process under the Fourteenth Amendment.
16
 Accordingly, they sought 
compensation, not invalidation of the law.
17
 Faced with this takings 
challenge, the Court curiously turned to Nectow, a case that involved 
only a due process challenge. Citing Nectow, the Court added a new 
                                                      
9. 277 U.S. 183 (1928). 
10. Id. at 185. 
11. Id. at 186. 
12. Id. at 188. For current statements of the substantive due process test, see Lingle v. Chevron 
U.S.A., Inc., 544 U.S. 528, 542 (2005) (“[A] regulation that fails to serve any legitimate 
governmental objective may be so arbitrary or irrational that it runs afoul of the Due Process 
Clause.”), and N. Pacifica LLC v. City of Pacifica, 526 F.3d 478, 484 (9th Cir. 2008) (citing Crown 
Point Dev. Inc. v. City of Sun Valley, 506 F.3d 851, 856 (9th Cir. 2007)) (noting that a due process 
claim exists where “land use action lacks any substantial relation to the public health, safety, or 
general welfare” and that “[t]he irreducible minimum of a substantive due process claim challenging 
land use regulation is failure to advance any governmental purpose”). 
13. Nectow, 277 U.S. at 188–89. 
14. Id. 
15. 447 U.S. 255 (1980). 
16. Id. at 258. 
17. Id. at 259. 
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element to the federal takings analysis: government action effects a 
taking if it does not “substantially advance legitimate state interests.”
18
 
Agins began a quarter-century misadventure for federal takings law. 
Even if mostly in dicta, the Court continued to recite the Agins 
“substantially advances” element as part of the federal takings analysis 
in subsequent cases.
19
 
The U.S. Supreme Court corrected its mistake in 2005. Lingle v. 
Chevron U.S.A., Inc.
20
 involved a state statute intended to protect small, 
independent gas station operators by reducing the amount of rent that oil 
companies could charge their gas station dealers.
21
 An oil company 
challenged the constitutionality of the statute under the Takings 
Clause.
22
 Invoking Agins and its progeny, the oil company argued that 
the statute took its property—and thus the government owed the 
company compensation—because the statute failed to substantially 
advance a legitimate state interest.
23
 
Although the company’s argument prevailed as the case shifted 
several times between the federal district and circuit courts,
24
 a 
unanimous and contrite U.S. Supreme Court ultimately rejected that 
argument. The Court ruled that it had erred in Agins: “Today we correct 
course. We hold that the ‘substantially advances’ formula is not a valid 
takings test, and indeed conclude that it has no proper place in our 
takings jurisprudence.”
25
 The Court removed the “substantially 
advances” element because it was aimed at the wrong target. The 
“substantially advances” element is “derived from due process, not 
takings, precedents”
26
 and ultimately probes whether a regulation is 
effective, not whether it takes property.
27
 “The notion that . . . a 
                                                      
18. Id. at 260. Applying that analysis to the challenged zoning ordinance, the Court ultimately 
rejected the challenge. Id. at 261–63. 
19. See Lingle v. Chevron U.S.A., Inc., 544 U.S. 528, 546 (2005) (“[I]n most of the cases reciting 
the ‘substantially advances’ formula, the Court has merely assumed its validity when referring to it 
in dicta.” (citing Tahoe-Sierra Pres. Council, Inc. v. Tahoe Reg’l Planning Agency, 535 U.S. 302, 
334 (2002); Monterey v. Del Monte Dunes at Monterey, Ltd., 526 U.S. 687, 704 (1999); Lucas v. 
S.C. Coastal Council, 505 U.S. 1003, 1016 (1992); Yee v. Escondido, 503 U.S. 519, 534 (1992); 
United States v. Riverside Bayview Homes, Inc., 474 U.S. 121, 126 (1985))).  
20. 544 U.S. 528 (2005). 
21. Id. at 532–33. 
22. Id. at 533. 
23. Id. at 533–34. 
24. Id. at 534–36. 
25. Id. at 548. 
26. Id. at 540. 
27. Id. at 542. 
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regulation . . .‘takes’ private property for public use merely by virtue of 
its ineffectiveness or foolishness is untenable.”
28
 Instead, the goal of the 
federal takings analysis is “to identify regulatory actions that are 
functionally equivalent to the classic taking in which government 
directly appropriates private property or ousts the owner from his 
domain.”
29
 To do that, the federal analysis “focuses directly upon the 
severity of the burden that government imposes upon private property 
rights.”
30
 By contrast, Agins’ “substantially advances” element “reveals 
nothing about the magnitude or character of the burden a particular 
regulation imposes upon private property rights.”
31
 
In correcting course by removing the “substantially advances” 
element, Lingle provided a concise summary of the three remaining 
elements of the federal takings analysis. Two of those elements probe 
“categorical” or “per se” takings.
32
 First, in a test associated most closely 
with Loretto v. Teleprompter Manhattan CATV Corp.,
33
 a taking occurs 
“where government requires an owner to suffer a permanent physical 
invasion of her property—however minor . . . .”
34
 Second, using the test 
announced in Lucas v. South Carolina Coastal Council,
35
 government 
actions constitute takings where they “completely deprive an owner of 
‘all economically beneficial us[e]’ of her property . . . except to the 
extent that ‘background principles of nuisance and property law’ 
independently restrict the owner’s intended use of the property.”
36
 
Federal courts refer to that element as a test for a “total regulatory 
taking” or “total taking.”
37
 
                                                      
28. Id. at 543. 
29. Id. at 539. 
30. Id. 
31. Id. at 542 (emphasis in original). Because the oil company relied exclusively on the 
“substantially advances” element, the U.S. Supreme Court upheld the challenged statute without 
applying any of the other elements of the federal takings analysis. Id. at 545. 
32. Id. at 538 (using “per se” and “categorical”); Lucas v. S.C. Coastal Council, 505 U.S. 1003, 
1015 (1992) (“categorical”). 
33. 458 U.S. 419 (1982). 
34. Lingle, 544 U.S. at 538 (citing Loretto, 458 U.S. 419). 
35. 505 U.S. 1003 (1992). 
36. Lingle, 544 U.S. at 538 (alteration and emphasis in original) (quoting Lucas, 505 U.S. at 
1019, 1027–32). 
37. See, e.g., Lingle, 544 U.S. at 538 (“total regulatory taking”); Lucas, 505 U.S. at 1030 (“total 
taking”). 
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Finally, in situations that do not present a per se taking, federal courts 
apply the factors established in Penn Central Transportation Co. v. New 
York City
38
: 
Primary among those factors are “[t]he economic impact of the 
regulation on the claimant and, particularly, the extent to which 
the regulation has interfered with distinct investment-backed 
expectations.” In addition, the “character of the governmental 
action”—for instance whether it amounts to a physical invasion 
or instead merely affects property interests through “some public 
program adjusting the benefits and burdens of economic life to 
promote the common good”—may be relevant in discerning 
whether a taking has occurred.
39
 
For government action that survives application of the two per se 
elements, the Penn Central factors preclude resort to a single, yes-or-no 
question for resolving whether that action constitutes a taking.
40
 
Although the U.S. Supreme Court understands that each of the Penn 
Central factors “has given rise to vexing subsidiary questions,” the 
Court still embraces those factors as “the principal guidelines” for 
resolving takings claims left unresolved by the per se elements of the 
federal analysis.
41
 
Graphically, the federal takings analysis comprises the Loretto 
physical invasion element, the Lucas “total [regulatory] taking” element, 
and the Penn Central factors in a simple, sequential order: 
 
  
                                                      
38. 438 U.S. 104 (1978). 
39. Lingle, 544 U.S. at 538–39 (citations omitted) (quoting Penn Cent., 438 U.S. at 124). 
40. See Penn Cent., 438 U.S. at 124 (characterizing the factors as requiring “essentially ad hoc, 
factual inquiries” rather than a “set formula”). 
41. Lingle, 544 U.S. at 539. 
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B. The Washington Takings Analysis Remains a Quagmire for Those 
Who Must Discern and Apply It 
Little is simple about the Washington takings analysis, which must be 
extracted from confusing case law. The Washington analysis remains a 
quagmire that stymies those who must use it. 
1. The Complex Washington Takings Analysis Must Be Coaxed from 
Disjointed Case Law 
Washington case law has no analogue to Lingle. No single decision 
succinctly outlines the elements of the Washington takings analysis. 
Most recitations of the Washington analysis point to Guimont v. Clarke 
(Guimont I),
42
 issued in 1993, as the Washington State Supreme Court’s 
takings summary.
43
 Unfortunately, even Guimont I fails to fully or 
                                                      
42. 121 Wash. 2d 586, 854 P.2d 1 (1993). 
43. See, e.g., City of Seattle v. McCoy, 101 Wash. App. 815, 828, 4 P.3d 159, 166 (2000) (stating 
that Guimont I “outlines the framework for analyzing regulatory takings”); WASH. STATE ATT’Y 
GEN., ADVISORY MEMORANDUM: AVOIDING UNCONSTITUTIONAL TAKINGS OF PRIVATE PROPERTY, 
at 9 (2006) [hereinafter AG MEMO]; Elaine L. Spencer, Regulatory Taking and Inverse 
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clearly cover all the elements of the Washington takings analysis. As a 
result, the Washington analysis must be pieced together from disjointed 
case law.
44
 
An elaborate picture of the Washington takings analysis emerges 
from that exercise: 
 
 
 
 
Understanding the elements of the Washington takings analysis—and 
how it differs from the federal analysis—requires attention to detail and 
tolerance for complexity and inconsistencies. 
The Washington analysis employs the three elements that compose 
the federal analysis. Under the Washington analysis, and consistent with 
the federal analysis, courts begin by asking whether the government has 
                                                      
Condemnation, in 7 WASH. STATE BAR ASS’N, WASH. REAL PROPERTY DESKBOOK § 110.4(1), at 
110-16, § 110.4(2)–(3) (Edward W. Kuhrau et al. eds., 3d ed. 1996). 
44. In addition to Guimont I, the primary decisions through which the Washington State Supreme 
Court developed the Washington takings analysis were Margola Assocs. v. City of Seattle, 121 
Wash. 2d 625, 854 P.2d 23 (1993); Robinson v. City of Seattle, 119 Wash. 2d 34, 830 P.2d 318 
(1992); Sintra v. City of Seattle (Sintra I) 119 Wash. 2d 1, 829 P.2d 765 (1992); and Presbytery of 
Seattle v. King Cnty., 114 Wash. 2d 320, 787 P.2d 907 (1990). 
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physically invaded private property.
45
 If the court finds no physical 
invasion, it poses a question nearly identical to the one federal courts 
ask: whether the government has committed a “total [regulatory] taking” 
by denying the property owner “all economically viable use.”
46
 The 
Washington analysis ends with another element based on, even if not 
identical to, the federal Penn Central factors.
47
 What distinguishes 
Washington’s approach are three unique elements sandwiched between 
those endpoints. 
The first unique Washington element generally asks whether the 
regulation destroys some other fundamental attribute of property 
ownership, such as the right to possess, exclude others, or dispose.
48
 
Highlighting the imprecision of this element, the Washington State 
Supreme Court poses this question using a variety of verbs without 
appearing to intend different meanings—it does not seem to matter 
whether the regulation destroys,
49
 denies,
50
 deprives,
51
 derogates,
52
 
infringes on,
53
 or merely implicates
54
 some other fundamental attribute 
of property ownership. 
                                                      
45. Margola, 121 Wash. 2d at 644, 854 P.2d at 33–34; Guimont I, 121 Wash. 2d at 597, 854 P.2d 
at 7; accord Loretto v. Teleprompter Manhattan CATV Corp., 458 U.S. 419 (1982) (analogous 
federal authority). 
46. Guimont I, 121 Wash. 2d at 600, 602, 605, 854 P.2d at 9–10, 12 . The U.S. Supreme Court, 
by contrast, asks whether the government has denied the property owner all economically beneficial 
use. Lingle, 544 U.S. at 538; Lucas v. S.C. Coastal Council, 505 U.S. 1003, 1019, 1026–32 (1992). 
This Article urges the Washington State Supreme Court to adopt the federal analysis directly, which 
would mean using “beneficial” rather than “viable” in this element of the analysis. See infra text 
accompanying notes 262–63. 
47. Guimont I, 121 Wash. 2d at 596, 854 P.2d at 6; Presbytery, 114 Wash. 2d at 335–36, 787 
P.2d at 915. Unlike the U.S. Supreme Court, the Washington State Supreme Court casts these 
factors as probing whether the state’s legitimate interest is outweighed by the adverse economic 
impact on the landowner. See, e.g., Guimont I, 121 Wash. 2d at 604, 854 P.2d at 11; see also Peste 
v. Mason Cnty., 133 Wash. App. 456, 473, 136 P.3d 140, 149 (2006); Guimont v. City of Seattle 
(Guimont II), 77 Wash. App. 74, 81, 896 P.2d 70, 76–77 (1995). This Article urges the Washington 
State Supreme Court to correct this mischaracterization of the Penn Central factors. See infra Part 
III.B.1. 
48. Guimont I, 121 Wash. 2d at 601–02, 854 P.2d at 10; Robinson v. City of Seattle, 119 Wash. 
2d 34, 49–50, 52, 830 P.2d 318, 328–29 (1992); Presbytery, 114 Wash. 2d at 329–30, 333 & n.21, 
787 P.2d at 912, 914 & n.21. 
49. See Margola, 121 Wash. 2d at 643, 854 P.2d at 33; Robinson, 119 Wash. 2d at 50, 52, 830 
P.2d at 328–29; Presbytery, 114 Wash. 2d at 329–30, 787 P.2d at 912. 
50. See Presbytery, 114 Wash. 2d at 333, 787 P.2d at 914. 
51. See Guimont I, 121 Wash. 2d at 605 n.7, 854 P.2d at 12 n.7. 
52. See Robinson, 119 Wash. 2d at 49, 830 P.2d at 328. 
53. See Presbytery, 114 Wash. 2d at 333 n.21, 787 P.2d at 914 n.21. 
54. See Margola, 121 Wash. 2d at 645, 854 P.2d at 34; Guimont I, 121 Wash. 2d at 601, 603, 854 
P.2d at 9, 10. 
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Regardless of the verb it employs, the Washington State Supreme 
Court lumps the “fundamental attribute” element with two from the 
federal analysis—the “physical invasion” and “total [regulatory] taking” 
elements—into what the Court deems the first “threshold question.”
55
 
This grouping is odd because it does not actually comprise a single 
question. The “physical invasion” and “total [regulatory] taking” 
elements probe per se takings—affirmative answers to either of those 
elements ends the analysis with a finding of a taking.
56
 By contrast, 
application of the “fundamental attribute” element cannot end the 
analysis, but can only determine where the analysis turns next. If the 
challenged regulation does not destroy (or perhaps deny, deprive, 
derogate, infringe on, or merely implicate) a fundamental attribute of 
property ownership, the analysis moves to the second “threshold 
question”;
57
 otherwise, the analysis proceeds to what Washington deems 
the “takings analysis.”
58
 
The second “threshold question” consists of the second unique 
Washington element. It asks whether the regulation “seeks less to 
                                                      
55. See Margola, 121 Wash. 2d at 643–45, 854 P.2d at 33–34; Guimont I, 121 Wash. 2d at 594–
95, 854 P.2d at 6. The Court also refers to this as the first “threshold inquiry.” Margola, 121 Wash. 
2d at 643, 854 P.2d at 33; Guimont I, 121 Wash. 2d at 602–03, 854 P.2d at 10. Washington courts 
are not always clear about whether this question (or inquiry) consists of all three elements or just 
one. For example, one court recently cast the entire first threshold question as asking simply if there 
has been a “total taking.” Conner v. City of Seattle, 153 Wash. App. 673, 698, 223 P.3d 1201, 1214 
(2009), review denied, 168 Wash. 2d 1040 (2010). More frequently, Washington courts pose the 
first threshold question in terms solely of the “fundamental attribute” element, while mentioning the 
rights to exclude others (which necessarily includes a right against physical invasions) or to make 
some economically viable use of one’s property (which is implicit in the “total taking” element of 
the takings analysis) as mere examples of fundamental attributes. See, e.g., Margola, 121 Wash. 2d 
at 643–44, 854 P.2d at 33–34; Peste v. Mason Cnty., 133 Wash. App. 456, 471, 136 P.3d 140, 148 
(2006); Paradise, Inc. v. Pierce Cnty., 124 Wash. App. 759, 770, 102 P.3d 173, 179 (2004); 
Edmonds Shopping Cntr. Assocs. v. City of Edmonds, 117 Wash. App. 344, 362, 71 P.3d 233, 241 
(2003); City of Seattle v. McCoy, 101 Wash. App. 815, 828, 4 P.3d 159, 166 (2000); Kahuna Land 
Co. v. Spokane Cnty., 94 Wash. App. 836, 841–42, 974 P.2d 1250, 1252 (1999). 
56. See Margola, 121 Wash. 2d at 644, 854 P.2d at 33–34; Guimont I, 121 Wash. 2d at 602–03, 
854 P.2d at 10. 
57. Guimont I, 121 Wash. 2d at 603, 854 P.2d at 10. 
58. Guimont I, 121 Wash. 2d at 603–04, 854 P.2d at 10–11. Deepening the inscrutability of 
Washington takings case law, the Washington State Supreme Court reordered the two threshold 
questions in 1993. Id. at 600–01. As a result, pre-1993 case law discussing the first threshold 
question is actually discussing what is now the second threshold question. See, e.g., Presbytery, 114 
Wash. 2d at 329–30, 787 P.2d at 912. This complicates the task facing anyone attempting to 
research the background and relationship of the elements that compose the Washington takings 
analysis.  
The Washington State Supreme Court first explained the rationale for grouping the elements of 
the Washington analysis into “threshold questions” and a “takings analysis” in Presbytery. Id. This 
Article explains and critiques that rationale. See infra Part II.B. 
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prevent a harm than to impose on those regulated the requirement of 
providing an affirmative public benefit.”
59
 Under this element, 
government action designed primarily to prevent a harm is insulated 
from takings claims, whereas government action that primarily seeks to 
provide a public benefit enjoys no such protection.
60
 Clouding 
application of this element is a debate over whether it poses the relevant 
question. One faction of the Washington State Supreme Court argued 
that the proper question initially was, and should have remained, 
whether the regulation is employed to enhance the value of publicly held 
property.
61
 Despite this protest and lingering confusion over the proper 
question posed by this element,
62
 most Washington courts recite a “seeks 
less to prevent a harm than to impose an affirmative public benefit” 
question as a unique element of the Washington takings analysis.
63
 
If the government has not committed a per se taking, and if either of 
Washington’s threshold questions yields an affirmative answer, the 
Washington analysis proceeds to what the Washington State Supreme 
Court calls the “takings analysis.”
64
 This label leaves the misimpression 
that the “threshold questions” are somehow outside the Washington 
takings analysis. Nevertheless, what the Washington State Supreme 
Court labels the “takings analysis” begins with the third element unique 
                                                      
59. See Guimont I, 121 Wash. 2d at 603, 854 P.2d at 10 (quoting Robinson, 119 Wash. 2d at 49, 
830 P.2d at 328); Sintra v. City of Seattle (Sintra I), 119 Wash. 2d 1, 14, 829 P.2d 765, 772 (1992). 
60. See Guimont I, 121 Wash. 2d at 603, 854 P.2d at 10; Presbytery, 114 Wash. 2d at 329–30 & 
n.13, 787 P.2d at 912 & n.13. 
61. Guimont I, 121 Wash. 2d at 617–20, 854 P.2d at 18–20 (Utter, J., concurring) (citing 
Presbytery, 114 Wash. 2d at 329, 787 P.2d at 912; Orion Corp. v. State, 109 Wash. 2d 621, 651, 747 
P.2d 1062, 1078 (1987)). Although not cited in any of the Washington case law relevant to this 
debate, historical support for an “enhance the value of publicly held property” element was offered 
by a scholar who, in a 1980 article, argued that a taking must involve a transfer of property from a 
property owner to a government with the power of eminent domain and “only when governmental 
land receives ‘special’ benefits or perhaps ‘special and direct’ benefits.” William B. Stoebuck, 
Police Power, Takings, and Due Process, 37 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 1057, 1091–93 (1980). 
62. See, e.g., Manufactured Hous. Cmtys. of Wash. v. State, 142 Wash. 2d 347, 355, 13 P.3d 183, 
187 (2000) (summarizing the question in dicta as whether “the regulations were employed to 
enhance the value of publicly held property” (citing Orion, 109 Wash. 2d at 651, 747 P.2d at 
1078)). 
63. See, e.g., Sintra, Inc. v. City of Seattle (Sintra II), 131 Wash. 2d 640, 676, 935 P.2d 555, 573 
(1997) (Durham, J., concurring) (citing Guimont I, 121 Wash. 2d at 595, 854 P.2d at 6) (“A 
restriction or condition on the use of property which goes beyond the prevention of harm to provide 
an affirmative ‘benefit to the public’ may constitute a regulatory taking.”); Paradise, Inc. v. Pierce 
Cnty., 124 Wash. App. 759, 770–74, 102 P.3d 173, 179–81 (2004); Rhoades v. City of Battle 
Ground, 115 Wash. App. 752, 772, 63 P.3d 142, 152 (2002). 
64. “The court first asks two threshold questions to determine if a regulation is susceptible to a 
takings challenge. If the regulation passes this threshold inquiry, the court proceeds to a takings 
analysis.” Guimont I, 121 Wash. 2d at 594, 854 P.2d at 5. 
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to Washington takings law: Does the regulation substantially advance a 
legitimate state interest?
65
 This, of course, is the due process-based 
question that Lingle removed from the federal analysis in 2005.
66
 If the 
court answers that question in the negative, the regulation is a taking.
67
 If 
the answer is affirmative, the court proceeds to the final element, which 
is based on the Penn Central factors adopted from the federal analysis.
68
 
2. Federal Courts, the Washington Court of Appeals, and Attorneys 
Struggle to Apply the Washington Takings Analysis 
The complexity of the Washington takings analysis is perhaps lost on 
the Washington State Supreme Court, which has avoided entangling 
itself in its own creation. After developing the Washington takings 
analysis from 1987 through 1993,
69
 the Court essentially exited the 
takings field. Since then, the Court has either denied review of actual 
takings cases,
70
 resolved takings claims without resorting to (or even 
mentioning) the Washington analysis,
71
 or reviewed collateral takings 
                                                      
65. Presbytery, 114 Wash. 2d at 333, 787 P.2d at 914. 
66. For a discussion of Lingle, see supra text accompanying notes 20–31. 
67. Margola Assocs. v. City of Seattle, 121 Wash. 2d 625, 645, 854 P.2d 23, 35 (1993). 
68. Id. at 645–46, 854 P.2d at 35. Connecting the factors recited in Margola to Penn Central 
involves several steps. See id. (citing Presbytery of Seattle v. King Cnty., 114 Wash. 2d 320, 336, 
787 P.2d 907, 915 (1990)); Presbytery, 114 Wash. 2d at 336 n.30, 787 P.2d at 915 n.30 (citing 
Keystone Bituminous Coal Ass’n v. DeBenedictis, 480 U.S. 470, 495 (1987)); Keystone, 480 U.S. 
at 495 (quoting Kaiser Aetna v. United States, 444 U.S. 164, 175 (1979)); Kaiser Aetna, 444 U.S. at 
175 (citing Penn Cent. Transp. Co. v. New York City, 438 U.S. 104, 124 (1978)). 
69. This Article details and critiques the evolution of the Washington takings analysis. See infra 
text accompanying notes 111–37. 
70. See, e.g., Peste v. Mason Cnty., 133 Wash. App. 456, 471–73, 136 P.3d 140, 148–49 (2006), 
review denied, 159 Wash. 2d 1013, 154 P.3d 919 (2007); City of Des Moines v. Gray Buss., LLC, 
130 Wash. App. 600, 611–15, 124 P.3d 324, 330–32 (2005), review denied, 158 Wash. 2d 1024, 
149 P.3d 379 (2006); Paradise, Inc. v. Pierce Cnty., 124 Wash. App. 759, 767–74, 102 P.3d 173, 
177–81 (2004), review denied, 154 Wash. 2d 1027, 120 P.3d 73 (2005); Guimont v. City of Seattle 
(Guimont II), 77 Wash. App. 74, 79–85, 896 P.2d 70, 75–79, review denied, 127 Wash. 2d 1023, 
904 P.2d 1157 (1995). 
71. Brutsche v. City of Kent, 164 Wash. 2d 664, 680–84, 193 P.3d 110, 119–21 (2008) (applying 
Eggleston v. Pierce County, 148 Wash. 2d 760, 64 P.3d 618 (2002), to resolve the Washington 
constitutional claim, and applying federal law to the federal takings claim); Tiffany Family Trust 
Corp. v. City of Kent, 155 Wash. 2d 225, 233–37, 119 P.3d 325, 332–32 (2005) (refusing to 
entertain the takings claim because the claimant failed to follow statutory procedural prerequisites); 
Eggleston, 148 Wash. 2d at 768–69, 64 P.3d at 623–24 (resolving the case on historical evidence 
that, when Washington adopted its constitution, damaging property for evidence in a criminal case 
did not constitute a taking); Asarco, Inc. v. Dep’t of Ecology, 145 Wash. 2d 750, 760–61, 43 P.3d 
471, 476 (2001) (dismissing the takings claim as unripe, and in dictum citing only federal takings 
authority). 
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issues unrelated to whether a government action constituted a taking for 
which compensation was due.
72
 
The closest the Court came to applying the Washington analysis was 
in Manufactured Housing Communities of Washington v. State.
73
 
Manufactured Housing did not involve the usual assertion of a taking 
remediable through compensation. Instead, the case involved a facial 
challenge to the validity of a statute that gave qualified tenants a right of 
first refusal to purchase their mobile home parks.
74
 Because the plaintiff 
property owners sought to invalidate the statute, their claim was 
premised on an argument that the government lacked the authority to 
take any property, even if compensated.
75
 The Court reasoned that, 
before it could determine whether the government had the authority to 
take property through that statute, the Court first had to determine 
whether the statute, if it were applied, would actually take property.
76
 To 
do that, the Court purported to apply the Washington analysis.
77
 In 
reality, the Court resolved Manufactured Housing by applying law that 
differed from that analysis in two crucial respects. 
First, Manufactured Housing misstated the Washington analysis. 
Citing its prior takings decisions, the Court reported that a regulation 
could be challenged on a “facial” or “categorical” basis for four reasons, 
including that the regulation destroys any fundamental attribute of 
property ownership.
78
 Applying that rule, Manufactured Housing 
concluded that the challenged statute would constitute a taking solely 
because it would deprive owners of the right of first refusal, which the 
                                                      
72. Dickgeister v. State, 153 Wash. 2d 530, 538–42, 105 P.2d 26, 30–32 (2005) (finding that 
logging activity constituted a “public use” such that an inverse condemnation claim should be 
allowed to proceed to trial, but not applying any takings analysis to the facts of that case); 
Manufactured Hous. Cmtys. of Wash. v. State, 142 Wash. 2d 347, 370–74, 13 P.3d 183, 194–96 
(2000) (finding that the potential taking would not be for a “public use”); Phillips v. King Cnty., 
136 Wash. 2d 946, 959–60, 964–65, 968 P.2d 871 (1998) (refusing to treat the claim as raising a 
regulatory takings issue, as the court of appeals had); Sintra, Inc. v. City of Seattle (Sintra II), 131 
Wash. 2d 640, 644–45, 935 P.2d 555, 558 (1997) (dealing with the amount of compensation due 
after constitutional violations had already been established). 
73. 142 Wash. 2d 347, 13 P.3d 183 (2000). 
74. Id. at 351, 13 P.3d at 185. 
75. Id. at 353, 13 P.3d at 186; see also infra text accompanying note 273 (discussing 
Manufactured Housing in the context of its decision to invoke independent state constitutional 
grounds for its decision). 
76. Manufactured Housing, 142 Wash. 2d at 363–64, 13 P.3d at 191. 
77. Id. at 355, 13 P.3d at 187 (reciting certain elements of the Washington analysis); id. at 363–
68, 13 P.3d at 191–94 (applying one of those elements). 
78. Id. at 355, 13 P.3d at 187. 
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court deemed a fundamental attribute of property ownership.
79
 But no 
such rule exists. Under the Washington takings analysis, the only way to 
prove a facial or categorical taking is to establish either a physical 
invasion or a total regulatory taking.
80
 Beyond that, even if a property 
owner establishes that a regulation infringes on some other fundamental 
attribute of property ownership, the owner must still prove, on a fact-
specific basis, that the regulation does not advance a legitimate state 
interest or fails application of the Penn Central factors.
81
 Because 
Manufactured Housing neither followed nor overruled the Washington 
takings analysis the Court had finalized just seven years earlier, the 
decision remains little more than an example of the inconsistency 
plaguing Washington takings jurisprudence. 
Second, Manufactured Housing added yet another reason, untethered 
to the Washington analysis, for finding that the challenged statute would 
take property. Through elusive logic, Manufactured Housing leapt from 
dated case law about the authority to condemn property to a conclusion 
that a taking may be proven through an implicit “condemnatory effect”: 
Washington law recognizes that “‘[t]he authority to condemn 
must be expressly given or necessarily implied.’” State ex rel. 
Wauconda Inv. Co. v. Superior Court, 68 Wash. 660, 662, 124 
P. 127 (1912) (emphasis added) (quoting 1 John Lewis, A 
TREATISE ON THE LAW OF EMINENT DOMAIN (3d ed.) § 371, at 
679 (3d ed. 1909)). While [the challenged statute] says nothing 
                                                      
79. Id. at 368, 13 P.3d at 193. 
80. Guimont v. Clarke (Guimont I), 121 Wash. 2d 586, 602–03, 854 P.2d 1, 10 (1993). 
81. Id. at 603–04, 13 P.2d at 10–11. Manufactured Housing also said that merely proving that 
“the regulations were employed to enhance the value of publicly [owned] property” would, like the 
“fundamental attribute” element, be sufficient to establish a “facial” or “categorical” taking. 
Manufactured Housing, 142 Wash. 2d at 355, 13 P.3d at 187. Although Manufactured Housing did 
not actually apply the “enhance the value of publicly owned property” test, its recitation of that test 
suffered from two problems. First, as with the “fundamental attribute” test, the Court misstated its 
own precedent, which maintains that a facial or categorical taking may be proven only by 
establishing a physical invasion or a deprivation of all economically viable use. See Guimont I, 121 
Wash. 2d at 602–04, 854 P.2d at 10–11. Second, seven years before Manufactured Housing, the 
Court declined to use “enhance the value of publicly owned property” as an element of the 
Washington analysis, and held instead that the question is really whether the regulation seeks less to 
prevent a harm than to impose the requirement of providing an affirmative public benefit. Compare 
Guimont I, 121 Wash. 2d at 603, 854 P.2d at 10 (identifying the element) with id., 121 Wash. 2d at 
617–20, 854 P.2d at 18–20 (Utter, J., concurring) (arguing unsuccessfully that the element should be 
phrased as whether a regulation is used to enhance the value of publicly owned property). See supra 
text accompanying notes 61–63. 
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about condemnation, its condemnatory effect is necessarily 
implied.
82
 
Manufactured Housing cited no Washington or federal case law for this 
“condemnatory effect” test. None exists in the Washington takings 
analysis. 
Although the Washington State Supreme Court has managed to 
sidestep its own takings analysis, the rest of Washington’s legal 
community has not. Federal courts have drawn different and often 
incorrect lessons from the Washington takings analysis. For example, in 
Heitman v. City of Spokane Valley,
83
 the U.S. District Court for the 
Eastern District of Washington eschewed the Washington analysis 
altogether and applied only the federal analysis to resolve a takings 
claim brought under the U.S. and Washington State Constitutions.
84
 By 
contrast, in Tapps Brewing, Inc. v. City of Sumner,
85
 the U.S. District 
Court for the Western District of Washington first applied the federal 
analysis to resolve a federal takings claim, and then applied the 
Washington analysis on the mistaken assumption that it is unique to 
claims under the Washington State Constitution.
86
 Furthermore, the 
court in Tapps Brewing was confused by the Washington analysis. The 
court reported that affirmative answers to Washington’s threshold 
questions mean that the challenged government action is “susceptible to 
a constitutional taking challenge,” while a negative answer means that 
the action is “subjected to a Penn Central type analysis.”
87
 There is, 
however, no actual difference between a “taking challenge” under the 
Washington analysis and application of the Penn Central factors; the 
                                                      
82. Manufactured Housing, 142 Wash. 2d at 369–70 (emphasis in original); id., 13 P.3d at 194 
(same, but incorrectly citing In re Willis Ave., 56 Mich. 244, 22 N.W. 871 (1885), rather than Lewis, 
as the source of the quote in Wauconda). Under the facts of that case, the Court ruled that, “in 
effect,” a taking occurred because the challenged statute transferred a fundamental attribute away 
from one property owner to another. Id., 142 Wash. 2d at 370, 13 P.3d at 194. 
83. No. CV-09-0070-FVS, 2010 WL 816727 (E.D. Wash. Mar. 5, 2010). 
84. Heitman v. City of Spokane Valley, No. CV-09-0070-FVS, 2010 WL 816727, at *4–6 (E.D. 
Wash. Mar. 5, 2010). 
85. 482 F. Supp. 2d 1218 (W.D. Wash. 2007), aff’d sub nom. McGlung v. City of Sumner, 548 
F.3d 1219 (9th Cir. 2008), cert. denied, ___ U.S. ___, 129 S. Ct. 2765 (2009). 
86. Tapps Brewing, 482 F. Supp. 2d at 1228–32. Although the property owners appealed the 
district court decision, they did not seek appellate review of their state law claims. See McGlung, 
548 F.3d at 1223 n.1. The Washington takings analysis has remained a mistaken attempt to track 
federal law under the U.S. Constitution; it has never been an application of unique Washington 
constitutional protections. See infra text accompanying notes 111–22, 228–29, and 269–72. 
87. Tapps Brewing, 482 F. Supp. 2d at 1231–32. 
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latter are an integral part of the former.
88
 The threshold questions 
determine which challenged actions must go through a takings challenge 
(including the Penn Central factors) and which need not.
89
 
The Washington Court of Appeals also has attempted to apply the 
Washington takings analysis since 1993
90
 and, to no surprise, has been 
confused by the analysis. The court expressed its frustration most 
pointedly in its 1995 decision in Guimont v. City of Seattle 
(Guimont II),
91
 a case involving the same parties as, but legal issues 
distinct from, the case that resulted in the Washington State Supreme 
Court’s 1993 Guimont I decision.
92
 In attempting to recite the takings 
analysis, Guimont II mistakenly included the “fundamental attribute of 
property ownership” element twice, forcing the court of appeals to 
search unsuccessfully for “a clue to the distinction” in this repetition.
93
 
Guimont II considered whether repetition of the element could have been 
caused by distinctions among the verbs “destroy,” “derogate,” and 
“infringe,” but the court ultimately rejected that as the reason and 
abandoned the search.
94
 
As testament to the confusion surrounding Washington’s takings law, 
the Washington Court of Appeals in Peste v. Mason County
95
 
subsequently misread Guimont II’s unsuccessful search for a clue as a 
success.
96
 Peste not only followed Guimont II’s mistaken repetition of 
the “fundamental attribute” element, but also recited as settled law what 
Guimont II merely considered but rejected as a reason for the repetition: 
                                                      
88. See Guimont I, 121 Wash. 2d at 595–96, 854 P.2d at 6 (explaining that government action 
susceptible to a “takings challenge” is subject to application of the Penn Central factors, even if not 
identifying them as such). 
89. See Guimont I, 121 Wash. 2d at 594, 854 P.2d at 5. 
90. Peste v. Mason Cnty., 133 Wash. App. 456, 471–74, 136 P.3d 140, 148–49 (2006); City of 
Des Moines v. Gray Buss., LLC, 130 Wash. App. 600, 611–15, 124 P.3d 324, 330–32 (2005); 
Paradise, Inc. v. Pierce Cnty., 124 Wash. App. 759, 767–74, 102 P.3d 173, 177–81 (2004); 
Edmonds Shopping Ctr. Assocs. v. City of Edmonds, 117 Wash. App. 344, 362–64, 71 P.3d 233, 
241–42 (2003); Rhoades v. City of Battle Ground, 115 Wash. App. 752, 770–72, 63 P.3d 142, 152–
53 (2002); City of Seattle v. McCoy, 101 Wash. App. 815, 827–39, 4 P.3d 159, 166–72 (2000); 
Kahuna Land Co. v. Spokane Cnty., 94 Wash. App. 836, 841–43, 974 P.2d 1250, 1252–53 (1999); 
Schreiner Farms, Inc. v. Smitch, 87 Wash. App. 27, 32–38, 940 P.2d 274, 276–80 (1997); Guimont 
v. City of Seattle (Guimont II), 77 Wash. App. 74, 79–86, 896 P.2d 70, 75–79 (1995); Jones v. King 
Cnty., 74 Wash. App. 467, 478–79, 874 P.2d 853, 859 (1994). 
91. 77 Wash. App. 74, 896 P.2d 70 (1995). 
92. See id. at 77–78, 896 P.2d at 75 (distinguishing Guimont I). 
93. Id. at 80–81 & n.6, 896 P.2d at 76 & n.6. 
94. Id. 
95. 133 Wash. App. 456, 471–74, 136 P.3d 140, 148–49 (2006) 
96. Peste, 133 Wash. App. at 472–73, 136 P.3d at 148–49. 
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distinctions between “infringe” and “destroy.”
97
 Given the complexity of 
the Washington analysis, such confusion should not be surprising. 
Guimont II’s critique of the Washington analysis went further. 
Beyond its confusion over its mistaken repetition of the “fundamental 
attribute” element, Guimont II also could not determine “where the 
analysis goes if a regulation does not effect a ‘total taking’ or ‘physical 
invasion’ but does implicate a fundamental attribute of property 
ownership.”
98
 The court ultimately decided that, under the facts of that 
case, it could “leave this conundrum to another day.”
99
 With perceptible 
relief, Guimont II noted that “this case does not require us to completely 
rehash the complex, confusing and often-ethereal realm of theoretical 
law that has developed in Washington under the taking clause of the 5th 
and 14th Amendments to the United States Constitution.”
100
 Aptly 
recognizing what would be involved in trying to untangle the 
Washington takings analysis, Guimont II confessed “we have no desire 
to add more heat to the discussion at the expense of light . . . .”
101
 
Because attorneys must advise their clients in advance of any 
litigation, they frequently struggle with the Washington takings analysis. 
This is especially true of attorneys for local governments. The 
Washington Growth Management Act (GMA)
102
 embraces a number of 
land use planning goals to guide the development of local 
comprehensive plans and development regulations.
103
 Among those 
goals is one that parrots the Federal Takings Clause: “Private property 
shall not be taken for public use without just compensation having been 
made.”
104
 Local governments can face litigation to overturn 
comprehensive plan or development regulation amendments on the 
ground that local governments adopted them without first evaluating the 
                                                      
97. Id. at 472–73, 136 P.3d at 149; cf. Guimont II, 77 Wash. App. at 81 n.6, 896 P.2d at 76 n.6. 
98. Guimont II, 77 Wash. App. at 85 n.9, 896 P.2d at 78 n.9 (emphasis in original). 
99. Id. at 85 n.9, 896 P.2d at 78 n.9. 
100. Id. at 79, 896 P.2d at 75–76. 
101. Id. at 80, 896 P.2d at 76. 
102. WASH. REV. CODE §§ 36.70A.010–.903 (2010). 
103. Those goals include the reduction of urban sprawl, the encouragement of affordable housing 
and economic development, and the preservation of historic resources. Id. § 36.70A.020(2), (4), (5), 
(13). A comprehensive plan is a “generalized coordinated land use policy statement of the 
governing body of a county or city.” Id. § 36.70A.030(4). Development regulations are “the controls 
placed on development or land use activities by a county or city.” Id. § 36.70A.030(7). The GMA 
requires counties with populations above a certain size, and the cities within those counties, to 
“adopt a comprehensive plan under [the GMA] and development regulations that are consistent with 
and implement the comprehensive plan.” Id. § 36.70A.040(3)(d). 
104. WASH. REV. CODE § 36.70A.020(6) (2010); accord U.S. CONST. amend. V: “[N]or shall 
private property be taken for public use, without just compensation.” 
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amendments’ potential to take property unconstitutionally.
105
 To help 
local governments meet this procedural requirement to subject almost 
every piece of local land use legislation to a takings analysis, the GMA 
directs Washington’s Attorney General to establish an “orderly, 
consistent process, including a checklist if appropriate, that better 
enables . . . local governments to evaluate proposed regulatory or 
administrative actions to assure that such actions do not result in an 
unconstitutional taking of private property.”
106
 Unfortunately, the 
Attorney General’s process does little more than prompt local 
governments to consider the elements of the convoluted Washington 
takings analysis.
107
 Like others’ good faith attempts to explain the 
Washington analysis as black letter law,
108
 the Attorney General’s 
                                                      
105. The Growth Management Hearings Boards have initial jurisdiction over claims that a local 
comprehensive plan or development regulation amendment violates the GMA. WASH. REV. CODE 
§ 36.70A.280 (2010); see generally WASH. REV. CODE §§ 36.70A.250–36.70A.330 (2010) 
(provisions related to the Board). Although the Washington Legislature recently ordered the various 
boards to consolidate, they remained three separate entities, each with jurisdiction over a distinct 
region of Washington, during the first two decades of the GMA’s existence. Compare Act of July 
16, 1991, ch. 32, § 5, 1991 Wash. Sess. Laws 2903, 2907 (initial establishment of the Western 
Washington, Central Puget Sound, and Eastern Washington Growth Management Hearings Boards), 
with Act of Mar. 25, 2010, ch. 211, § 17, 2010 Wash. Sess. Laws 1679, 1697–98 (recent 
consolidation). All of the boards agreed that the GMA provides a cause of action to enforce the 
GMA’s takings goal through a procedural requirement that local governments must give 
“appropriate” or “adequate” consideration to whether comprehensive plan and development 
regulation amendments might effect a taking. See, e.g., Shulman v. City of Bellevue, No. 95-3-
0076, 1996 WL 681286, at *7 (Cent. Puget Sound Growth Mgmt. Hearing Bd. May 13, 1996); 
Achen v. Clark Cnty., No. 95-2-0067c, 1995 WL 903178, at *6 (W. Wash. Growth Mgmt. Hearing 
Bd. Sept. 20, 1995). 
106. WASH. REV. CODE § 36.70A.370(1) (2010). Although the GMA orders local governments to 
use the Attorney General’s process, WASH. REV. CODE § 36.70A.370(2) (2010), the GMA makes 
clear that it does not “grant[] a private party the right to seek judicial relief requiring compliance” 
with that requirement. WASH. REV. CODE § 36.70A.370(4) (2010) (emphasis added). Nevertheless, 
the formerly distinct Growth Management Hearings Boards disagreed on whether a private party 
could seek a board order to force a local government to comply with the Attorney General’s 
process. Compare Shulman, 1996 WL 681286, at *11 (no cause of action), and Wilma v. Stevens 
Cnty., No. 06-1-0009c, 2007 WL 1153336, at *24 (E. Wash. Growth Mgmt. Hearing Bd. Mar. 12, 
2007) (same), with Laurel Park Cmty., LLC v. City of Tumwater, No. 09-2-0010, 2009 WL 
3844487, at *10–12 (W. Wash. Growth Mgmt. Hearing Bd. Oct. 13, 2009) (finding that a city failed 
to comply with the Attorney General’s process). 
107. AG MEMO, supra note 43, at 13–16 (advising the use of “warning signals” that are 
essentially the questions posed by the various elements of the Washington takings analysis). 
108. See, e.g., Spencer, Regulatory Taking, supra note 43, § 110.4 (3d ed. 1996 & Supp. 2002); 
Timothy H. Butler, Presentation at Government Takings Seminar: Overview of State Regulatory 
Takings Law (Nov. 15, 2001). 
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largely uncritical summary of the analysis risks misstatement, 
oversimplification, and loss of critical detail.
109
 
In sum, the Washington takings analysis vexes anyone trying to 
understand and apply it. Despite the Washington State Supreme Court’s 
declaration two decades ago that it had delivered Washington takings 
law from its quagmire,
110
 the Washington analysis continues to mire 
those who venture into it. 
II. THE WASHINGTON TAKINGS ANALYSIS IS UNFOUNDED 
If complexity were its only vice, there would be little justification for 
criticizing the Washington takings analysis. Law does not have to be 
simple. 
But law should be well-founded. The Washington takings analysis is 
unfounded on at least three levels. First, the Washington analysis is 
fatally undermined by the fact that it differs from the analysis 
established by the U.S. Supreme Court, which must remain the ultimate 
arbiter of how courts apply federal constitutional protections. Second, 
the Washington analysis is constitutionally insufficient because it 
enhances protections for government and thus necessarily lowers the 
floor of protection set for property owners by the federal analysis. 
Finally, each of the elements unique to the Washington analysis offers 
little value or has been discredited by the U.S. Supreme Court. 
A. Differences Between the Washington and Federal Takings 
Analyses Fatally Undermine the Washington Analysis 
The Washington State Supreme Court created the Washington 
analysis as an interpretation of the Takings Clause of the U.S. 
Constitution. The Court believed that it successfully coordinated the 
Washington and federal analyses of that provision. The Court was 
mistaken. The analyses are decidedly different. That fact alone is a fatal 
flaw of the Washington analysis. 
Understanding how the Court committed this error requires a review 
of the decisions that built the unique Washington analysis from 1987 
                                                      
109. See, e.g., AG MEMO, supra note 43, at 7–10 (recognizing few differences between the 
Washington and federal analyses). This is not meant as a criticism of the Attorney General’s 
memorandum, which is a laudable attempt to comply with the GMA’s directive to assist local 
governments. The Attorney General is not at liberty to change the Washington takings analysis, and 
the Attorney General’s memorandum is not an appropriate platform from which to urge reform of 
that analysis. 
110. Presbytery of Seattle v. King Cnty., 114 Wash. 2d 320, 328, 787 P.2d 907, 912 (1990). 
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through 1993. Decided in 1987, Orion Corp. v. State
111
 devoted pages to 
discussing the Court’s view of how Washington takings case law had 
departed from elusive and ambiguous federal case law.
112
 Orion 
ultimately decided to follow the federal takings analysis: “[I]n order to 
avoid exacerbating the confusion surrounding the regulatory takings 
doctrine, and because the federal approach may in some instance provide 
broader protection, we will apply the federal analysis to review all 
regulatory takings claims, including Orion’s.”
113
 By then relying 
primarily on federal case law to review the claim before it,
114
 Orion not 
only rendered its discussion of the unique Washington approach dictum, 
but also declared that approach to be different from, and less desirable 
than, the federal analysis. 
Having identified and then rejected a unique Washington approach in 
Orion, the Court appropriately hewed to federal law three months later 
when it next faced a takings claim in Allingham v. City of Seattle.
115
 For 
the recitation of the takings analysis in that decision, the Court cited only 
a federal takings decision and a 1968 Washington decision that did not 
actually involve a takings claim.
116
 As originally issued, Allingham did 
not even cite Orion.
117
 
                                                      
111. 109 Wash. 2d 621, 747 P.2d 1062 (1987). 
112. Id. at 645–53, 747 P.2d at 1075–79. 
113. Id. at 657, 747 P.2d at 1082. 
114. Id. at 658–66, 670–71, 747 P.2d at 1082–86, 1088. 
115. 109 Wash. 2d 947, 952–53, 749 P.2d 160, 163–64, modified, 757 P.2d 533 (1988), overruled 
in part on other grounds by Presbytery, 114 Wash. 2d at 335, 787 P.2d at 915. 
116. Id. at 952, 749 P.2d at 163 (“A zoning ordinance constitutes a taking of private property 
where it (1) does not substantially promote legitimate public interests, or (2) deprives the owner of 
any profitable use of the land.” (citing Agins v. Tiburon, 447 U.S. 255, 260–61, (1980); Carlson v. 
Bellevue, 73 Wash. 2d 41, 51, 435 P.2d 957 (1968))). Although the U.S. Supreme Court 
subsequently removed Agins and the “substantially promotes legitimate public interests” element 
from the federal takings analysis, see supra text accompanying notes 20–31 (discussing Lingle), that 
element was part of the federal analysis when Allingham was decided in 1988. To the extent that 
Carlson touched upon takings law, it recited federal authority. See Carlson, 73 Wash. 2d at 44–45, 
435 P.2d at 959 (invoking federal law similar to what became the Penn Central factors to resolve a 
challenge to an exercise of “legislative discretion” under an “arbitrary and capricious” standard of 
review). 
117. Although inconsistent with the proper distinction between due process claims (for which 
invalidation is the proper constitutional remedy) and takings claims (for which compensation is the 
proper constitutional remedy), see supra text accompanying notes 5–8, the plaintiffs in Allingham 
successfully pressed a takings claim to seek invalidation of the challenged land use regulation, not 
compensation for application of that regulation. Allingham, 109 Wash. 2d at 948, 953, 749 P.2d at 
161, 164. Perhaps aware of this inconsistency, the Washington State Supreme Court later modified 
Allingham to add a two-sentence footnote, one sentence of which cited Orion generally for the 
following statement: “The remedy we grant of invalidation of the ordinance is a remedy consistent 
with the denial of substantive due process.” 757 P.2d at 534 (Order Changing the Opinion). This 
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In 1990, the Court compounded the confusion it sought to avoid in 
Orion. In Presbytery of Seattle v. King County,
118
 the Court explained 
that it was considering “the ‘taking’ analysis used by the United States 
Supreme Court and by this court in Orion.” 
119
 On its face, this statement 
could refer only to the federal takings analysis because Orion applied 
federal case law in lieu of a unique Washington analysis.
120
 But that is 
apparently not what Presbytery meant. Presbytery displayed no 
appreciation of the fact that Orion abandoned a Washington takings 
analysis in favor of the federal analysis. Instead of reading Orion as 
having chosen between a federal and a Washington analysis, Presbytery 
cast Orion as having “coordinated” both analyses into the start of a 
“comprehensive formula” for resolving takings challenges.
121
 To 
improve that coordinated, federal-state formula, Presbytery devoted six 
pages to converting the unique Washington approach described in Orion 
into a formal, multi-part analysis through citations to both federal and 
Washington case law.
122
 
Despite deriving a “comprehensive formula” from Orion and thereby 
radically recasting Orion’s true lesson, Presbytery did not actually apply 
that formula or any other takings analysis because the Court resolved 
Presbytery not on takings grounds, but on ripeness grounds.
123
 This 
crucial juncture in Washington’s takings law—where the Washington 
State Supreme Court formally articulated a unique analysis on the 
mistaken assumption that it was coordinating Washington and federal 
law—therefore arose in dictum.
124
 
                                                      
was likely a reference to Orion’s discussion of the respective remedies available for takings and due 
process violations. See Orion, 109 Wash. 2d at 649, 747 P.2d at 1077. 
The Washington State Supreme Court later overruled Allingham in part, not because it invoked 
federal takings law instead of Orion’s summary of Washington takings law, but because Allingham 
misapplied federal law on the question of whether the entire parcel of property must be considered 
when determining whether a taking has occurred. See Presbytery of Seattle v. King Cnty., 114 
Wash. 2d 320, 335, 787 P.2d 907, 915 (1990). 
118. 114 Wash. 2d 320, 787 P.2d 907 (1990). 
119. Id. at 333, 787 P.2d at 914. 
120. See Orion Corp. v. State, 109 Wash. 2d 621, 658–66, 670–71, 747 P.2d 1062, 1082–86, 
1088 (1987). 
121. Presbytery, 114 Wash. 2d at 328, 787 P.2d at 912. 
122. Id. at 329–30, 333–37, 787 P.2d at 912, 914–16. 
123. Compare id. at 327, 787 P.2d at 911 (explaining in a “Prefatory Note” why the Court felt 
compelled to explore takings law even though the Court ultimately resolved the case on ripeness 
grounds), with id. at 337–40, 787 P.2d at 916–18 (resolution of the case). 
124. Accord Jeffrey M. Eustis, Between Scylla and Charybdis: Growth Management Act 
Implementation That Avoids Takings and Substantive Due Process Limitations, 16 U. PUGET 
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Two years later, in 1992, when faced with its next pair of takings 
cases—Sintra v. City of Seattle (Sintra I)
125
 and Robinson v. City of 
Seattle
126
—the Court welcomed its first opportunity to apply the 
coordinated analysis it had heralded in Presbytery: “This court’s recent 
opinions in [Orion and Presbytery] have formulated a comprehensive 
state ‘regulatory takings’ doctrine. Thus, this State’s current rule on the 
law of inverse condemnation has only recently taken shape, and [the new 
pair of cases present] opportunities for this court to apply [its] recently 
adopted analysis.”
127
 Sintra I and Robinson embraced Presbytery’s 
assumption that the Court had coordinated the federal and Washington 
takings analyses into a seamless whole in which federal and Washington 
authority coexist without friction.
128
 Both cases presented claims solely 
under the U.S. Constitution.
129
 The Court noted that “[s]tate law may 
provide useful guidance in this determination, but federal law is 
ultimately controlling.”
130
 Nevertheless, the Court followed its 
Presbytery dictum (which incorrectly equated the Washington takings 
analysis with the federal takings analysis) rather than its Orion dictum 
(which cast the Washington analysis as different from, and less desirable 
than, the federal analysis).
131
 
The following year, in 1993, the Court tinkered with the Washington 
analysis in another pair of decisions, both of which underscored the 
Court’s mistaken assumption that it had successfully blended 
Washington and federal takings law. First, in Guimont v. Clarke 
(Guimont I),
132
 the Court modified Presbytery’s description of the 
Washington analysis to incorporate the “total [regulatory] taking” 
element that the U.S. Supreme Court added to the federal analysis in 
                                                      
SOUND L. REV. 1181, 1191–92 (1993) (recognizing that Presbytery’s framework “was largely set 
forth in dicta”). 
125. 119 Wash. 2d 1, 829 P.2d 765 (1992). 
126. 119 Wash. 2d 34, 830 P.2d 318 (1992). 
127. Id., 119 Wash. 2d at 47–48, 830 P.2d at 327. As it turned out, the Court was able to take 
advantage of that opportunity only in Robinson. Because the Court dismissed Sintra I as unripe, it 
did not apply a takings analysis, but instead discussed it only as dictum. Sintra I, 119 Wash. 2d at 
18–20, 829 P.2d at 774–76. 
128. See, e.g., Sintra I, 119 Wash. 2d at 13–14, 829 P.2d at 772 (“In Presbytery . . . this court 
clarified regulatory takings analysis and made plain the necessary steps to show that a taking had 
occurred.”). 
129. Sintra I, 119 Wash. 2d at 14, 829 P.2d at 772; Robinson, 119 Wash. 2d at 47, 830 P.2d at 
327. 
130. Sintra I, 119 Wash. 2d at 14, 829 P.2d at 772. 
131. Id. at 13–18, 829 P.2d at 771–74; Robinson, 119 Wash. 2d at 49–54, 830 P.2d at 327–30. 
132. 121 Wash. 2d 586, 854 P.2d 1 (1993). 
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1992.
133
 Guimont I applied “only the federal constitution” and, in 
determining whether a taking had occurred in that case, cited far more 
federal authority than it cited Presbytery or other Washington case 
law.
134
 Finally, in Margola Associates v. City of Seattle,
135
 the Court 
recited the Washington analysis as newly modified by Guimont I 
(dubbing it the “revised Presbytery analysis”),
136
 and then cited federal 
case law almost exclusively to find that no taking occurred.
137
 
At least two weaknesses emerge from the six-year evolution of the 
Washington takings analysis. One relatively minor weakness stems from 
the circumstances of its birth: its origins in dicta should undercut its 
precedential value.
138
 
The other weakness is fatal: the existence of differences between the 
Washington and federal takings analyses. When, as here, the 
Washington State Supreme Court interprets the U.S. Constitution, the 
Court is not free to substitute its own analysis for that of the U.S. 
Supreme Court, which “acts as the final arbiter of controversies arising 
under the federal constitution.”
139
 Although the Washington State 
Supreme Court articulated this axiom in a different context, its words 
apply to a present-day analysis of takings claims: 
These questions . . . are by no means novel; they have often been 
raised, and the supreme court [of the United States] has often 
considered them, as an analysis of its cases will readily reveal. It 
scarcely needs be said that, with respect to matters involving the 
Federal constitution, we, as an inferior tribunal, must follow the 
pronouncements of that court no matter what our private views 
may be.
140
 
                                                      
133. Id. at 594–604, 854 P.2d at 5–11 (incorporating Lucas v. S.C. Coastal Council, 505 U.S. 
1003 (1992)). For a discussion of the role Lucas plays in the federal takings analysis, see supra text 
accompanying notes 36–37. 
134. Guimont v. Clarke (Guimont I), 121 Wash. 2d at 604–08, 854 P.2d at 11–13. 
135. 121 Wash. 2d 625, 854 P.2d 23 (1993). 
136. Id. at 642–46, 854 P.2d at 33–35. 
137. Id. at 646–49, 854 P.2d at 35–36. The Washington Court of Appeals appears to accept the 
notion that the Washington and federal takings analyses are equivalent. That court has frequently 
applied the Washington analysis only after noting that federal takings law must control. E.g., 
Schreiner Farms, Inc. v. Smitch, 87 Wash. App. 27, 33–35, 940 P.2d 274, 277–78 (1997); Guimont 
v. City of Seattle (Guimont II), 77 Wash. App. 74, 79 n.4, 896 P.2d 70, 75 n.4 (1995). 
138. See Malted Mousse, Inc. v. Steinmetz, 150 Wash. 2d 518, 531–32, 79 P.3d 1154, 1161 
(2003) (applying this reasoning to undercut other Washington State Supreme Court precedent). 
139. State v. Laviollette, 118 Wash. 2d 670, 673–74, 826 P.2d 684, 686 (1992). 
140. B.F. Goodrich Co. v. State, 38 Wash. 2d 663, 676, 231 P.2d 325, 332 (1951). 
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The U.S. Supreme Court has likewise reeled in state courts that attempt 
to apply a federal constitutional provision in a manner contrary to an 
established federal analysis.
141
 
Through its frequent consideration of takings claims, the U.S. 
Supreme Court has articulated a comprehensive federal takings analysis. 
Although the Washington State Supreme Court assumed it was 
coordinating the Washington and federal analyses from Presbytery 
through Margola, that assumption was incorrect then and remains 
incorrect today. As a glance at the flow charts representing the two 
analyses reveals,
142
 the federal and Washington takings analyses are, 
without doubt, different. The existence of those differences—even if one 
thought that they improved upon the federal analysis—cripples the 
Washington analysis. Because the U.S. Supreme Court has dictated the 
steps a court must take when analyzing a takings claim, the Washington 
State Supreme Court must follow those steps. Its failure to yield to the 
superior tribunal fundamentally undermines the Washington takings 
analysis. 
B. The Washington Takings Analysis Grew from an Illusory Premise 
into a Constitutionally Insufficient Substitute for the Federal 
Analysis 
Although the existence of differences between the Washington and 
federal takings analyses should provide an adequate basis for discarding 
the Washington analysis, an additional reason lies in the motivation for, 
and constitutional implications of, those differences. They stem from a 
premise that has proved unstable and led to a Washington analysis that is 
constitutionally insufficient because it offers individuals fewer 
opportunities to prevail on a takings claim than under the federal 
analysis. 
1. The Washington Analysis Is Structured on a Police-Power-or-
Eminent-Domain Dichotomy and a Desire to Enhance Protections 
for Local Governments 
A unique and central feature of the Washington takings analysis is the 
prominent role substantive due process plays in shielding government 
from monetary damages. This feature is rooted in a line of cases that 
                                                      
141. See, e.g., North Carolina v. Butler, 441 U.S. 369, 375–76 (1979); Oregon v. Hass, 420 U.S. 
714, 719–20, 719 n.4 (1975). 
142. See supra figures following notes 41 and 44. 
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repeat a simple-sounding dichotomy: a regulation must be evaluated as 
an exercise of either the police power under due process law or the 
power of eminent domain under takings law.
143
 Because these cases 
paint the picture of two mutually exclusive categories, an action that is a 
valid exercise of the police power cannot also be a taking. 
The police-power-or-eminent-domain dichotomy grew from a 
nineteenth century U.S. Supreme Court decision, Mugler v. Kansas,
144
 
which observed that “[a] prohibition simply upon the use of property for 
purposes that are declared, by valid legislation, to be injurious to the 
health, morals, or safety of the community, cannot, in any just sense, be 
deemed a taking . . . .”
145
 Over three decades later, in its 1921 decision in 
Conger v. Pierce County,
146
 the Washington State Supreme Court relied 
on that statement to formulate Washington’s police-power-or-eminent-
domain dichotomy: “Eminent domain takes private property for a public 
use, while the police power regulates its use and enjoyment, or if it takes 
or damages it, it is not a taking or damaging for the public use, but to 
conserve the safety, morals, health and general welfare of the public.”
147
 
                                                      
143. See, e.g., Eggleston v. Pierce Cnty., 148 Wash. 2d 760, 767–68, 64 P.3d 618, 623 (2002) 
(“Courts have long looked behind labels to determine whether a particular exercise of power was 
properly characterized as police power or eminent domain.”); Presbytery of Seattle v. King Cnty., 
114 Wash. 2d 320, 329, 787 P.2d 907, 912 (1990) (“These two constitutional theories are 
alternatives in cases where overly severe land use regulations are alleged,” so in each case, the court 
must “determine which of these two constitutional tests to utilize”); Orion Corp. v. State, 109 Wash. 
2d 621, 646, 650–51, 747 P.2d 1062, 1075–76, 1078 (1987); Cougar Bus. Owners Ass’n v. State, 97 
Wash. 2d 466, 476, 647 P.2d 481, 486 (1982) (“It is a well established principle that if a regulation 
is a valid exercise of the State’s police powers, it does not constitute a taking.”); Rains v. Dep’t of 
Fisheries, 89 Wash. 2d 740, 745, 575 P.2d 1057, 1059 (1978) (“The critical determination under this 
constitutional provision is between a ‘taking’ and a regulation or restriction on the use of private 
property in the public interest, which is deemed to be a valid exercise of the police power of the 
State for which there is no right to compensation.”); Maple Leaf Investors, Inc. v. Dep’t of Ecology, 
88 Wash. 2d 726, 731, 565 P.2d 1162, 1164 (1977) (casting the issue as whether the government’s 
action “is a taking or damaging of private property for public use in violation of [the Washington 
State] Const. art. 1, § 16, and the fifth amendment to the United States Constitution, or whether the 
prohibition is a valid exercise of the state police power.”); Ackerman v. Port of Seattle, 55 Wash. 2d 
400, 408, 348 P.2d 664, 669 (1960) (“The difficulty arises in deciding whether a restriction is an 
exercise of the police power or an exercise of the eminent domain power.”), overruled on other 
grounds by Highline Sch. Dist. No. 401 v. Port of Seattle, 87 Wash. 2d 6, 548 P.2d 1085 (1976); 
Conger v. Pierce Cnty., 116 Wash. 27, 36, 198 P. 377, 380 (1921); City of Des Moines v. Gray 
Buss., LLC, 130 Wash. App. 600, 608, 124 P.3d 324, 328 (2005) (“The threshold question in any 
taking claim is whether the government action is an exercise of its eminent domain power or its 
police power.”); see also Stanley H. Barer, Comment, Distinguishing Eminent Domain from Police 
Power and Tort, 38 WASH. L. REV. 607 (1963). 
144. 123 U.S. 623 (1887). 
145. Id. at 668–69. 
146. 116 Wash. 27, 198 P. 377 (1921). 
147. Id. at 36, 198 P. at 380. 
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Subsequent Washington decisions recited the dichotomy as settled law, 
pointing to Mugler or Conger.
148
 
This line of authority collided with a separate line of federal case law 
that began in 1922, just one year after Washington embraced the police-
power-or-eminent-domain dichotomy in Conger. In Pennsylvania Coal 
Co. v. Mahon,
149
 the U.S. Supreme Court offered what eventually 
became an axiom of federal takings law: “The general rule at least is that 
while property may be regulated to a certain extent, if regulation goes 
too far it will be recognized as a taking.”
150
 This axiom left courts asking 
how a governmental action could simultaneously be: (1) both an exercise 
of the police power and a taking, as suggested by Pennsylvania Coal; 
and (2) only an exercise of the police power or the eminent domain 
power—but not both—as suggested by Mugler. 
The Washington takings analysis emerged from an effort to resolve 
this apparent conundrum. Orion took stock of how Washington courts 
had addressed this question. Orion cast Mugler and its progeny as 
holding that “an exercise of the police power protective of the public, 
health, safety, or welfare cannot be a taking requiring compensation” 
and concluded that the tension between that holding and Pennsylvania 
Coal rendered federal takings law ambiguous.
151
 The Court believed that 
this ambiguity left local governments uncertain about whether their land 
use regulations would be deemed a taking (for which compensation 
would necessarily be required) or a violation of due process (for which 
the remedy was mere invalidation of the regulation).
152
 Orion warned 
that the risk of paying compensation for a takings claim chills needed 
land use regulations: 
                                                      
148. See, e.g., Orion, 109 Wash. 2d at 646, 747 P.2d at 1075; Cougar Bus. Owners Ass’n, 97 
Wash. 2d at 476, 647 P.2d at 486–87; Rains, 89 Wash. 2d at 745, 575 P.2d at 1059; Maple Leaf 
Investors, 88 Wash. 2d at 732–33, 565 P.2d at 1165; Ackerman, 55 Wash. 2d at 408, 348 P.2d at 
669. 
149. 260 U.S. 393 (1922). 
150. Id. at 415; see Lingle v. Chevron U.S.A., Inc., 544 U.S. 528, 537 (2005) (describing this 
aspect of Pennsylvania Coal as a “watershed” in federal takings decisions). 
151. Orion, 109 Wash. 2d at 645–46, 747 P.2d at 1075. Academic articles in the 1980s and early 
1990s also described the tension between Mugler and Pennsylvania Coal. See, e.g., Stoebuck, supra 
note 61, at 1059–63, 1079 (casting Mugler and Pennsylvania Coal as being “hopelessly at odds” 
and “poles apart”); Ross A. Macfarlane, Comment, Testing the Constitutional Validity of Land Use 
Regulations: Substantive Due Process as a Superior Alternative to Takings Analysis, 57 WASH. L. 
REV. 715, 723 (1982) (concluding that the conflict between the two cases was never resolved); John 
M. Groen & Richard M. Stephens, Takings Law, Lucas, and the Growth Management Act, 16 U. 
PUGET SOUND L. REV. 1259, 1262 (1993) (“[T]his unresolved tension [between these two 
decisions] has been a source of much confusion and misinterpretation.”). 
152. Orion, 109 Wash. 2d at 649, 747 P.2d at 1077. 
021911WDR Wynne Post DTP Post Final Author Read.docx (Do Not Delete) 21/02/2011  04:40 
154 WASHINGTON LAW REVIEW [Vol. 86:125 
 
[C]hoosing to invoke the takings analysis instead of the due 
process test will necessarily trigger the specter of financial 
liability. If all excessive regulations require just compensation, 
rather than invalidation, land-use decision makers, who adopt 
regulations in a good faith attempt to prevent a public harm, will 
nevertheless be held strictly liable for regulations that result in a 
taking. Undoubtedly, the specter of strict financial liability will 
intimidate legislative bodies from making the difficult, but 
necessary choices presented by the most sensitive environmental 
land-use problems.
153
 
To resolve this apparent problem, Washington courts shielded local 
government from the specter of takings claims by effectively giving 
government the opportunity to cop a plea: to absorb a disappointing 
substantive due process loss that would at least preclude an expensive 
takings loss. According to Orion, Washington courts did this to resolve 
the tension in federal law in favor of Mugler and the police-power-or-
eminent-domain dichotomy it spawned: 
We have long recognized a conceptual difference between a 
“taking” by eminent domain, which takes property for public 
use, and the exercise of the police power, which limits the 
landowner’s use to “conserve the safety, morals, health and 
general welfare of the public.” In so doing, we have reflected the 
position adopted by the [U.S.] Supreme Court in Mugler, where 
the Court stated that a prohibition on injurious uses must be 
tested not under principles governing eminent domain, but rather 
under the due process guaranty.
154
 
Orion recognized that this position put Washington at odds with 
federal law: “Certain aspects of our state regulatory takings doctrine 
appear to conflict with federal analysis. We believe whatever differences 
exist result from our willingness to expressly recognize the role of 
substantive due process.”
155
 Orion decided not to follow prior 
Washington takings case law precisely because that law had departed 
from federal law. Instead, Orion applied the federal takings analysis to 
                                                      
153. Id. 
154. Id. at 650, 747 P.2d at 1078 (citations omitted); accord Richard L. Settle, Regulatory Taking 
Doctrine in Washington: Now You See It, Now You Don’t, 12 U. PUGET SOUND L. REV. 339, 368–
69 (1989) (noting that the difference in remedies to be applied motivated Orion “to make a precise 
determination of the relative applicability of due process and taking limitations”); Stoebuck, supra 
note 61, at 1097 (advocating use of substantive due process and its remedy as an “escape hatch” 
against takings claims). 
155. Orion, 109 Wash. 2d at 657, 747 P.2d at 1081. 
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reduce confusion and because the federal analysis might actually provide 
individuals broader protection.
156
 
That point was lost on the Washington State Supreme Court in its 
subsequent decisions that formulated the current Washington takings 
analysis.
157
 From Presbytery through Margola, the Court mistakenly 
assumed that Orion had harmonized Washington and federal takings 
law.
158
 That mistake committed Washington courts to a takings analysis 
premised on the Mugler police-power-or-eminent-domain dichotomy 
and structured around a prominent role for substantive due process to 
shield government from monetary damages. 
The unique “threshold questions” at the heart of the Washington 
analysis manifest the goal—articulated but rejected in Orion—of 
diverting takings claims into due process analyses where possible. The 
Washington State Supreme Court employs the “threshold questions” 
specifically “[t]o determine which of these constitutional tests to 
utilize”—takings or substantive due process.
159
 One of those questions 
asks whether the challenged regulation seeks less to prevent a harm than 
to impose the requirement of providing an affirmative public benefit.
160
 
Under the Washington takings analysis, a negative answer to that 
question is tantamount to a finding that the action is intended primarily 
to prevent a harm and must therefore constitute an exercise of the police 
power susceptible only to a due process challenge, not a takings 
challenge.
161
 The Washington State Supreme Court likewise casts a 
                                                      
156. Id. at 657, 747 P.2d at 1082. 
157. See supra text accompanying notes 118–37 (discussing how the Washington takings analysis 
evolved from Presbytery through Margola). 
158. Id. Orion determined that Washington case law had sided with Mugler over Pennsylvania 
Coal. See Orion, 109 Wash. 2d at 650, 747 P.2d at 1078. Nevertheless, Orion reported that 
Washington had somehow harmonized those decisions: “By harmonizing Pennsylvania Coal and 
Mugler, our case law implicitly recognized a dividing line between land-use regulations that deprive 
property rights with due process and land-use regulations that go one step further to effect a 
compensable taking.” Id. at 651, 747 P.2d at 1078. In reality, Pennsylvania Coal and Mugler cannot 
be harmonized. Pennsylvania Coal has supplanted Mugler. See infra text accompanying notes 164–
77; see also Eustis, supra note 124, at 1189–97 (criticizing how Washington case law “has run 
takings and substantive due process analyses together”). 
159. Presbytery of Seattle v. King Cnty., 114 Wash. 2d 320, 329, 787 P.2d 907, 912 (1990); 
accord Guimont v. Clarke (Guimont I), 121 Wash. 2d 586, 593–94, 854 P.2d 1, 5 (1993). 
160. Guimont I, 121 Wash. 2d at 594–95, 600, 603 & n.5, 854 P.2d at 6, 9, 10 & n.5; Robinson v. 
City of Seattle, 119 Wash. 2d 34, 49, 53, 830 P.2d 318, 328, 330 (1992); Sintra v. City of Seattle 
(Sintra I), 119 Wash. 2d 1, 14–16, 829 P.2d 765, 772–73 (1992). 
161. Guimont I, 121 Wash. 2d at 594–95, 854 P.2d at 6; Presbytery, 114 Wash. 2d at 329–30, 787 
P.2d at 912; accord AG MEMO, supra note 43, at 9 (“When government regulation has the effect of 
appropriating private property for a public benefit rather than to prevent some harm, it may be the 
functional equivalent of the exercise of eminent domain.”). 
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negative answer to the other threshold question—whether the regulation 
infringes on a fundamental attribute of property ownership—as 
potentially freeing the regulation from a takings challenge, even if the 
regulation might still face a substantive due process challenge.
162
 
Presbytery left no doubt that the Washington takings analysis would, by 
design, result in takings claims being diverted into a substantive due 
process analysis: 
No compensation (which properly belongs with a “taking” 
analysis) is warranted in the face of a due process violation. 
  Invalidation of the ordinance (instead of compensation) also 
avoids intimidating the legislative body . . . . Accordingly, many 
challenges to land use regulations will most appropriately be 
analyzed under a due process formula rather than under a 
“taking” formula.
163
 
Structuring Washington’s takings analysis around substantive due 
process law allowed the Washington State Supreme Court to relieve the 
perceived tension between Mugler (and its supposed holding that a valid 
exercise of the police power cannot be a taking) and Pennsylvania Coal 
(and its observation that an exercise of the police power can be a taking 
if it goes “too far”). Downplaying Pennsylvania Coal, the Court used the 
Mugler-inspired police-power-or-eminent-domain dichotomy to build a 
takings escape hatch for government. 
2. The Police-Power-or-Eminent-Domain Dichotomy Is Illusory 
The problem with designing a takings analysis to relieve the tension 
between Mugler and Pennsylvania Coal is that no such tension exists. 
Pennsylvania Coal controls. No takings analysis should be structured 
around Mugler or its supposed police-power-or-eminent-domain 
dichotomy. 
Mugler is effectively a dead letter for three reasons. First, Mugler’s 
brief diversion into takings law is weak precedent. Mugler neither cited 
nor mentioned the Fifth Amendment—the source of federal takings 
protections. Instead, Mugler dealt solely with a due process challenge 
raised under the Fourteenth Amendment by a brewer who unsuccessfully 
                                                      
162. Guimont I, 121 Wash. 2d at 603–04, 854 P.2d at 10–11; Presbytery, 114 Wash. 2d at 329–
30, 787 P.2d at 912. A negative answer to this question is not sufficient to avoid a takings claim 
under the Washington takings analysis; only negative answers to both threshold questions provides 
a shield from a takings claim. See Guimont I, 121 Wash. 2d at 595, 854 P.2d at 6 (describing the 
Presbytery version of the analysis); id. at 603–04, 854 P.2d at 10–11 (describing what remains in 
the current version). 
163. Presbytery, 114 Wash. 2d at 332–33, 787 P.2d at 913–14. 
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challenged a law that banned the brewing of beer.
164
 Mugler discussed 
takings only because the brewer premised an argument on Pumpelly v. 
Green Bay Co.,
165
 which involved a takings claim under the Wisconsin 
Constitution.
166
 Pumpelly dealt with the permanent flooding of land by 
the government that deprived the owner of all uses of the land.
167
 Mugler 
distinguished Pumpelly’s takings holding because it had “no application 
to the [due process] case under consideration” in Mugler.
168
 Mugler’s 
treatment of Pumpelly could have ended there. Nevertheless, in what is 
arguably dictum, Mugler then offered the sentence that continues to 
reverberate in Washington takings law: “A prohibition simply upon the 
use of property for purposes that are declared . . . to be 
injurious . . . cannot, in any just sense, be deemed a taking . . . for the 
public benefit.”
169
 Later in that same paragraph, in a sentence generally 
overlooked in Washington law, Mugler clarified that it was 
distinguishing government action that merely prevents a particular use 
while allowing other uses: “prohibition of [property’s] use in a particular 
way, whereby its value becomes depreciated, is very different from 
taking property for public use . . . .”
170
 Read in context, Mugler simply 
noted that the facts of Pumpelly—where government flooding destroyed 
land for all purposes—rendered it inapplicable to a brewing-ban claim, 
where the government was prohibiting the use of property only for a 
particular purpose. Put another way, Mugler presented a fact pattern 
that, had it actually been challenged as a taking in federal court today, 
would have been deemed to be a regulation that did not go far enough to 
                                                      
164. See Mugler v. Kansas, 123 U.S. 623, 657 (1887); accord id. at 657–64. Even as due process 
precedent, Mugler carries little weight. As recounted by the Washington State Supreme Court 
roughly a dozen years before Orion, Mugler was part of the now-abandoned era in which the U.S. 
Supreme Court used the Due Process Clause to strike down government regulations. Aetna Life Ins. 
Co. v. Wash. Life & Disability Ins. Guar. Ass’n, 83 Wash. 2d 523, 531–34, 520 P.2d 162, 168–69 
(1974). Aetna Life reported that “[t]he judicial intrusion of the due process clause upon a state’s 
police power reached its acme in Mugler . . . where the court defined the police power as embracing 
no more than the power to promote public health, morals and safety.” Id. at 532, 520 P.2d at 168. 
Concluding its history lesson, Aetna Life noted that the U.S. Supreme Court’s due process 
jurisprudence had come “full circle” by the middle of the twentieth century by repudiating cases like 
Mugler. Id. at 533–34, 520 P.2d at 169. 
165. 80 U.S. (13 Wall.) 166 (1872). 
166. Mugler, 123 U.S. at 667–68. 
167. See id. 
168. Id. at 668. 
169. Id. at 668–69 (emphasis added). 
170. Id. at 669. 
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constitute a taking under the rationale of Pennsylvania Coal.
171
 There is, 
in short, no tension between Mugler and Pennsylvania Coal on the 
question of what may constitute a taking. 
Second, the U.S. Supreme Court does not recognize any tension 
between Mugler’s diversion into takings law and Pennsylvania Coal’s 
announcement that a police power regulation may constitute a taking if it 
goes “too far.” Indeed, had there been any tension between the two 
decisions, one would expect Pennsylvania Coal to have distinguished 
Mugler. Yet Pennsylvania Coal did not even cite Mugler.
172
 
Finally, to the extent there might have been tension between Mugler 
and Pennsylvania Coal, the U.S. Supreme Court resolved it in favor of 
Pennsylvania Coal. In its 1992 Lucas decision,
173
 the U.S. Supreme 
Court rejected an argument that Mugler provided a police-power shield 
against takings claims. Lucas reversed a lower court that relied on 
Mugler to conclude incorrectly that a valid exercise of the police 
power—no matter the severity of its impact on the property owner—
could not be deemed a taking.
174
 The Court held that a government 
deprivation of “all economically beneficial uses,” even if in pursuit of a 
valid exercise of the police power, constitutes a taking, except to the 
extent that “background principles of nuisance and property law” 
independently restrict the owner’s intended use of the property.
175
 
According to Lucas, the facts of Mugler presented just one example of a 
case where a valid police power regulation merely affected property 
values without depriving the owner of all economically beneficial 
uses.
176
 In its 2005 Lingle decision, which rid the federal takings analysis 
                                                      
171. In 1992, the U.S. Supreme Court noted that, unlike other cases, Mugler involved only the 
“prohibition upon use of a building as a brewery; other uses [were] permitted.” Lucas v. S.C. 
Coastal Council, 505 U.S. 1003, 1026 n.13 (1992). 
172. One scholar speculated that the author of Pennsylvania Coal was aware of Mugler, even 
though Pennsylvania Coal did not cite Mugler. Macfarlane, supra note 151, at 723 n.54. 
173. Lucas v. S.C. Coastal Council, 505 U.S. 1003 (1992). 
174. See id. at 1009–10, 1020–22. 
175. Id. at 1019, 1026–32. 
176. Id. at 1022, 1026 n.13. Just a year after Lucas was announced, two scholars recognized it as 
Mugler’s death knell. Groen & Stephens, supra note 151, at 1284–85. Time has validated their 
pronouncement: the only relevant post-Lucas citation made by a U.S. Supreme Court justice to 
Mugler was in a dissenting opinion that cited both Lucas and Mugler to support the proposition that 
takings and due process analyses are distinct. Kelo v. City of New London, 545 U.S. 469, 519–20 
(2005) (Thomas, J., dissenting). 
 Another scholar credited First English Evangelical Lutheran Church of Glendale v. County of 
Los Angeles, 482 U.S. 304 (1987)—decided five years before Lucas—as “explicitly rejecting” 
Mugler. Settle, supra note 154, at 353, 375. This is incorrect. To the contrary, First English 
expressly noted that it had “no occasion to decide” the relevance of Mugler as a defense to a takings 
claim, and cited Mugler to keep open the possibility that the government in First English might be 
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of substantive due process law, a unanimous U.S. Supreme Court called 
Pennsylvania Coal a “watershed decision” in takings law, but did not 
even mention Mugler.
177
 Time has proved Pennsylvania Coal worthy of 
respect, but has left Mugler behind. 
Because Mugler plays no meaningful role in federal takings law, no 
foundation exists for the Mugler-inspired police-power-or-eminent-
domain dichotomy at the heart of the Washington takings analysis. The 
essential lesson from the U.S. Supreme Court in Lingle is that due 
process and takings analyses must be applied independently; a regulation 
may or may not violate due process protections, but that has nothing to 
do with whether the regulation constitutes a taking.
178
 Government 
action may continue to be a valid exercise of the police power (and thus 
survive a due process challenge) even if, as cautioned by Pennsylvania 
Coal, it also goes “too far” and constitutes a taking. The same action can 
violate neither, one, or both constitutional provisions.
179
 The U.S. 
Constitution does not force a binary choice. 
Because the police-power-or-eminent-domain dichotomy is illusory, 
there is no basis for Washington to allow local governments to evade a 
takings claim simply by demonstrating that the challenged action is an 
exercise of the police power, and thereby necessarily proving that the 
action cannot also be an exercise of eminent domain power subject to a 
takings claim. One has nothing to do with the other. The extent to which 
a government action resembles an act of eminent domain is at the heart 
of any takings analysis because an effective ouster from one’s domain is 
a “touchstone” of a taking.
180
 But assessing the extent to which the 
government action does not resemble a valid exercise of the police 
power is irrelevant to a takings analysis. If a property owner has been 
ousted, it should not matter whether the ouster resulted from an exercise 
of the police power. 
                                                      
able to demonstrate on remand that its challenged action was “insulated [from a taking claim] as a 
part of the State’s authority to enact safety regulations.” First English, 482 U.S. at 313; accord 
Groen & Stephens, supra note 151, at 1262 (asserting that the tension between Mugler and 
Pennsylvania Coal “reached its peak” in First English and another decision issued the same year). 
177. Lingle v. Chevron U.S.A., Inc., 544 U.S. 528, 537 (2005). 
178. See generally supra text accompanying notes 20–31 (discussing Lingle’s role in federal 
takings law). 
179. Federal decisions in the wake of Lingle recognize that property owners may maintain 
separate takings and due process challenges in the same suit. See, e.g., North Pacifica LLC v. City 
of Pacifica, 526 F.3d 478, 484–85 (9th Cir. 2008); Crown Point Dev., Inc. v. City of Sun Valley, 
506 F.3d 851, 856 (9th Cir. 2007). 
180. Lingle, 544 U.S. at 539. 
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It is difficult to blame the Washington State Supreme Court for 
confusing takings and due process law in the late 1980s and early 1990s. 
At that time, “[c]onfusion over the proper role of substantive due process 
and over the relationship between due process and takings [was] a 
pervasive problem . . . .”
181
 The U.S. Supreme Court itself did not rid the 
federal takings analysis of due process elements until Lingle in 2005.
182
 
But even if the Washington State Supreme Court could have legitimately 
justified structuring a unique state takings analysis around the police-
power-or-eminent-domain dichotomy two decades ago, the Court cannot 
sustain that justification today. 
3. The Washington Analysis Is Constitutionally Insufficient Because, 
by Design, It Hampers Property Owners’ Ability to Press Takings 
Claims 
The Washington State Supreme Court’s rationale for a unique 
Washington takings analysis not only lacks a foundation in law, but also 
calls into question the constitutional adequacy of the Washington 
analysis. Federal constitutional provisions set the floor—the minimum 
level of protection accorded individual rights against intrusion by the 
government.
183
 The Washington State Supreme Court embraced a 
takings analysis designed to fall below this floor of protection. 
In Orion, the Court conceded that “the federal approach may in some 
instance provide broader protection” than the Washington approach.
184
 
That concession rings true because the Washington approach employs 
substantive due process law to enhance protections for local 
governments,
185
 not property owners. Orion could afford to be frank 
                                                      
181. Stoebuck, Police Power, Takings, and Due Process, supra note 61, at 1081; accord Orion 
Corp. v. State, 109 Wash. 2d 621, 653, 747 P.2d 1062, 1079 (1987); see also Spencer, Regulatory 
Taking, supra note 43, § 110.4, at 110-14 (“[T]he vacuum in federal jurisprudence occurred at the 
very time when state courts, including Washington courts, were required by a series of cases to 
confront the issue [of what constitutes a taking].”). 
182. See generally supra text accompanying notes 20–31 (discussing Lingle’s role in federal 
takings law). 
183. Orion, 109 Wash. 2d at 652, 747 P.2d at 1079 (“It is well recognized . . . that the federal 
constitution sets a minimum floor of protection below which state law may not go.”). Because states 
may not provide less protection for individuals, the Washington State Supreme Court does not 
engage in constitutional analyses distinct from federal analyses unless “the constitution of the State 
of Washington should be considered as extending broader rights to its citizens than does the United 
States Constitution.” State v. Gunwall, 106 Wash. 2d 54, 61, 720 P.2d 808, 812 (1986) (emphasis 
added). 
184. Orion, 109 Wash. 2d at 657–58, 747 P.2d at 1082. 
185. See supra Part II.B.1. 
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about the fact that the Washington analysis may set a lower floor of 
takings protection for individuals because Orion opted not to embrace a 
unique Washington analysis and expressly decided the better course was 
to follow the federal analysis.
186
 
The Washington State Supreme Court ultimately did not heed the 
caution advised by Orion. By embracing the unique Washington analysis 
outlined in the Orion dictum on the mistaken belief that Orion 
harmonized Washington and federal takings law, Presbytery and 
subsequent Washington State Supreme Court decisions set a lower floor 
of takings protection for individuals. The Washington analysis was 
designed to offer the government an opportunity to defeat a takings 
claim and avoid paying compensation, albeit in exchange for facing a 
substantive due process challenge.
187
 Therefore, to enhance protections 
for government, the Washington analysis diverts property owners from 
the Fifth Amendment remedy of compensation and toward the 
Fourteenth Amendment remedy of invalidating the challenged 
government action. 
In an analogous situation, the U.S. Supreme Court held that a state 
court’s attempt to substitute invalidation for compensation was 
“constitutionally insufficient.” In First English Evangelical Lutheran 
Church of Glendale v. County of Los Angeles,
188
 the Court considered 
whether the government owed compensation for the time during which it 
applied a regulation ultimately found to effect a taking, or whether 
invalidation of the regulation was sufficient.
189
 A California court had 
decided that invalidation was the appropriate remedy by reasoning that 
the threat of paying compensation would inhibit salutary land use 
regulation: “In combination, the need for preserving a degree of freedom 
in the land-use planning function, and the inhibiting financial force 
                                                      
186. Id. at 657, 747 P.2d at 1081–82. For a fuller discussion of the evolution of the Washington 
analysis, including Orion’s role, see supra text accompanying notes 111–37. 
187. See supra text accompanying notes 159–63. For example, by demonstrating only that a 
challenged regulation is designed more to prevent a harm than to provide an affirmative public 
benefit, a government can defeat a takings claim under the Washington analysis. See, e.g., Connor 
v. City of Seattle, 153 Wash. App. 673, 700, 223 P.3d 1201, 1214–15 (2009) (finding no need to 
engage in further takings analysis after concluding that the challenged regulation safeguards the 
public interest in the environment), review denied, 168 Wash. 2d 1040, 233 P.3d 889 (2010); 
Paradise, Inc. v. Pierce Cnty., 124 Wash. App. 759, 773–74, 102 P.3d 173, 180–81 (2004) 
(declining to consider a plaintiff’s Penn Central argument because the court had answered the 
various “threshold questions” in the negative); Jones v. King Cnty., 74 Wash. App. 467, 479–80, 
874 P.2d 853, 859 (1994) (failing to mention, let alone reach, the Penn Central factors after 
answering the “impose an affirmative public benefit” question in the negative). 
188. 482 U.S. 304, 322 (1987). 
189. Id. at 306–07. 
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which inheres in the [compensation] remedy, persuade us that on 
balance mandamus or declaratory relief rather than [compensation] is the 
appropriate relief under the circumstances.”
190
 The U.S. Supreme Court 
disagreed and held that where government action amounts to a taking, 
invalidation of the action cannot relieve the government of “the duty to 
provide compensation for the period during which the taking was 
effective.”
191
 The Court concluded that a desire to shield government 
from the risk of compensation cannot trump the Fifth Amendment: 
We realize that even our present holding will undoubtedly lessen 
to some extent the freedom and flexibility of land-use planners 
and governing bodies of municipal corporations when enacting 
land-use regulations. But such consequences necessarily flow 
from any decision upholding a claim of constitutional right; 
many of the provisions of the Constitution are designed to limit 
the flexibility and freedom of governmental authorities, and the 
Just Compensation Clause of the Fifth Amendment is one of 
them.
192
 
The Washington takings analysis suffers from the same constitutional 
infirmity. Like the California court reined in by First English, the 
Washington State Supreme Court has decided to shield government 
policy-makers from the specter of the compensation remedy by 
channeling property owners toward the invalidation remedy.
193
 Under 
First English, this is constitutionally insufficient.
194
 If government action 
                                                      
190. Id. at 317 (quoting the language of the opinion of the California Court of Appeals, which the 
U.S. Supreme Court reviewed directly after the California State Supreme Court denied review); see 
id. at 308–09 (history of the state proceedings). 
191. Id. at 321. 
192. Id. at 321; see also id. at 317 (“We, of course, are not unmindful of these considerations 
[regarding the possible inhibition of land use regulation], but they must be evaluated in the light of 
the command of the Just Compensation Clause of the Fifth Amendment.”). 
193. See, e.g., Presbytery of Seattle v. King Cnty., 114 Wash. 2d 320, 332–33, 787 P.2d 907, 
913–14 (1990) (“Invalidation of the ordinance (instead of compensation) also avoids intimidating 
the legislative body . . . .”); Orion Corp. v. State, 109 Wash. 2d 621, 649, 747 P.2d 1062, 1077 
(1987). (“Undoubtedly, the specter of strict financial liability will intimidate legislative bodies from 
making the difficult, but necessary choices presented by the most sensitive environmental land-use 
problems.”). 
194. Orion aptly recognized that First Evangelical “invalidat[ed] as violative of the Fifth and 
Fourteenth Amendments the California rule limiting the remedy for a regulatory taking to 
invalidation.” Orion, 109 Wash. 2d at 652, 747 P.2d at 1079. Yet that observation—like Orion’s 
rejection of a unique Washington’s takings analysis—was lost on the Washington State Supreme 
Court as it embraced and tinkered with the Washington analysis from Presbytery in 1990 through 
Guimont I and Margola in 1993. See supra text accompanying notes 111–37 (discussing the 
evolution of the Washington takings analysis); accord Jill M. Teutsch, Comment, Taking Issue With 
Takings: Has the Washington Supreme Court Gone Too Far?, 66 WASH. L. REV. 545, 546 (1991) 
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constitutes a taking under the federal analysis, compensation is due. 
Washington may not lower that floor of constitutional protection.
195
 
C. Each of the Unique Elements of the Washington Takings Analysis 
Offers Little Value or Has Been Discredited by the U.S. Supreme 
Court 
Setting aside the Washington State Supreme Court’s constitutionally 
dubious mission of shielding government from the specter of paying 
compensation, might there still be value in the three unique elements 
distinguishing the Washington takings analysis from its federal 
counterpart? Those elements require a court to ask whether the 
challenged government action: 
1. destroys some “other fundamental attribute” of property 
ownership (beyond constituting a physical invasion or a 
deprivation of all economically viable use); 
2. seeks less to prevent a harm than to impose on those 
regulated the requirement of providing an affirmative public 
benefit; and 
3. substantially advances a legitimate state interest.
196
 
Washington’s unique elements offer little value or have been discredited 
by the U.S. Supreme Court. They cannot justify the unique Washington 
takings analysis. 
                                                      
(concluding that Presbytery “fails to comport with federal precedent” and thus is “constitutionally 
suspect”). 
195. Cf. Dolan v. City of Tigard, 512 U.S. 374, 383 (1994) (“The Takings Clause of the Fifth 
Amendment of the United States Constitution [is] made applicable to the States through the 
Fourteenth Amendment . . . .”). It does not matter that, through a federal statute, a property owner 
might be entitled to compensation for damages resulting from a government action that denies the 
property owner due process. See 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (2006); Sintra, Inc. v. City of Seattle (Sintra II), 
131 Wash. 2d 640, 651–54, 935 P.2d 555, 561–62 (1997). Practically, that alternative remedy would 
be unavailable in a situation where government action takes private property without also violating 
due process protections. See supra note 12 (current statements of the substantive due process test) 
and Part II.B.2 (explaining that an action that takes property need not also violate due process 
protections). Legally, a court should not deny a remedy provided by the U.S. Constitution—the 
highest law of the land—just because a statute might yield a similar remedy in some situations. 
196. These elements are discussed in greater detail supra in text accompanying notes 48–66, and 
are depicted in the figure following note 44. 
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1. The “Fundamental Attribute” Element Stems from an Incorrect 
Prediction About the Direction of Federal Law, and Can Be 
Subsumed into the Penn Central Factors 
At heart, asking whether a government action destroys some other 
fundamental right of property ownership raises the question of what 
“property” means. That is a necessary question because there is nothing 
relevant to “take” within the meaning of constitutional protections if the 
regulation does not affect “property.”
197
 
But why make this a separate inquiry? The question of whether a 
“fundamental” property ownership interest is affected could be 
addressed through application of the Penn Central factors. The first 
factor requires a court to consider the regulation’s impact on the 
property owner—an exercise that must include an evaluation of the 
owner’s underlying property interest.
198
 Elevating this to a separate, 
“threshold” inquiry is redundant. 
Another reason to question the “other fundamental attribute” element 
is its origin as an incorrect prediction about the direction of federal 
takings law. Moreover, that prediction was offered not in Washington 
case law,
199
 but in a 1989 law review article.
200
 Published two years after 
the Washington State Supreme Court began articulating a unique 
                                                      
197. See, e.g., Manufactured. Hous. Cmtys. of Wash. v. State, 142 Wash. 2d 347, 363–64, 13 
P.3d 183, 191 (2000) (“Before engaging in a takings analysis, however, it must first be determined 
if ‘property’ has actually been taken.”). 
198. See Penn Cent. Transp. Co. v. New York City, 438 U.S. 104, 124–25 (1978) (discussing 
“decisions in which this Court has dismissed ‘taking’ challenges on the ground that, while the 
challenged government action caused economic harm, it did not interfere with interests that were 
sufficiently bound up with the reasonable expectations of the claimant to constitute ‘property’ for 
Fifth Amendment purposes”). 
199. The phrase “fundamental attribute” appears in Orion, the 1987 decision that triggered the 
evolution of the current Washington takings analysis, but the phrase appears only in the portion of 
the decision where the Court ultimately resolved the case by applying the federal Penn Central 
factors. Orion, 109 Wash. 2d at 664–65, 747 P.2d at 1085. In that passage, Orion was applying 
Keystone Bituminous Coal Ass’n v. DeBenedictis, 480 U.S. 470 (1987), a case that itself invoked the 
ad hoc Penn Central factors—factors common to the federal and the Washington takings analyses. 
See Keystone, 480 U.S. at 494–95. The point of that passage was simply that, because the property 
owner could identify no fundamental attribute of property ownership that the challenged regulation 
extinguished, the property owner was limited to arguing that a mere reduction in property value was 
sufficient to constitute a taking under what was effectively the Penn Central factors. Orion, 109 
Wash. 2d at 664–65, 747 P.2d at 1085. By contrast, under the takings analysis constructed by the 
Washington State Supreme Court in subsequent decisions, a property owner who cannot 
demonstrate that a fundamental attribute of property ownership has been extinguished fails to 
answer one of the “threshold questions” in the affirmative and risks never being able to apply the 
Penn Central factors. 
200. Settle, supra note 154. 
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Washington takings analysis in Orion, the article attempted to discern 
order amid the apparent chaos of federal law not from articulated 
standards, but by inferring principles and doctrine from the results of 
case law.
201
 The article observed that, at that time, the U.S. Supreme 
Court had “never held a regulation that merely restricts use, no matter 
how severely, to be a taking.”
202
 The article reasoned that, “[u]nless or 
until the Supreme Court holds that the taking clause is no longer 
applicable to use regulation cases, much can be done to reduce confusion 
about the governing principles.”
203
 According to the article, a 
“threshold” governing principle was the need to identify regulations that 
affect fundamental attributes of property ownership: 
This threshold principle, consistently implied but never clearly 
articulated by the courts, effectively recognizes that there are 
two categories of police power regulation that are subject to 
quite different taking standards. These categories divide 
regulations, on the basis of their purpose and effect, into those 
that effectively deprive a property owner of a fundamental 
attribute of property and those that do not.
204
 
This distinction was so important, the article concluded, that it should be 
made “at the beginning of the taking inquiry.”
205
 
The U.S. Supreme Court ultimately did not follow the path down 
which the article inferred the Court was headed. In its 1992 Lucas 
decision, the Court undermined the premise of the article’s analysis by 
holding that a regulation that only restricts the use of property can be a 
taking, if the regulation deprives the property owner of “all 
economically beneficial uses” of the property.
206
 Contrary to the article’s 
prediction, the U.S. Supreme Court has not employed a “fundamental 
attribute” distinction as a separate question, threshold or otherwise.
207
 
                                                      
201. The author was frank about his use of inference. See, e.g., id. at 354 (“[D]octrine may be 
inferable from some of the decisions even though it has not been fully articulated.”); see also id. at 
389 n.308 (acknowledging that a particular inference had not “been clearly or fully articulated by 
the courts. However, to the extent that the doctrine is unarticulated and intuitive, coherent principles 
explaining outcomes are inferable”); id. at 402 (“This Article focused on what is and, by logical 
inference and extrapolation, what might be the law of regulatory takings.”). 
202. Id. at 391. 
203. Id. at 392. 
204. Id. at 386–87 (footnotes omitted). 
205. Id. at 389. 
206. Lucas v. S.C. Coastal Council, 505 U.S. 1003, 1019 (1992) (emphasis in original). 
207. Although the article’s predictions ultimately proved incorrect, one should not judge the 
article too harshly. At the time, both federal and Washington takings jurisprudence was in a state of 
flux. The article appropriately called for greater clarity from courts, cautioning that, “[w]ithout a 
solid foundation of guiding principles, largely intuitive judicial responses and vague, somewhat 
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The Washington State Supreme Court did not have the benefit of 
hindsight as it began constructing a unique Washington takings analysis. 
In Presbytery, issued after Orion but before Lucas, the Court grafted the 
article’s inferred threshold “fundamental attribute” question onto the 
Washington analysis. Citing the 1989 article liberally, the Court 
concluded that, to determine whether to apply a due process or a takings 
analysis to a challenged regulation, one of the first questions courts 
should ask is “whether the regulation destroys one or more of the 
fundamental attributes of ownership . . . .”
208
 Once grafted, this element 
remained a part of the Washington analysis,
209
 despite its grounding in 
what proved to be an incorrect prediction about the direction in which 
federal takings law was headed. 
2. The “Seeks Less to Prevent a Harm than Provide a Public Benefit” 
Element Is Unworkable and Premised on Due Process Law, Not 
Takings Law 
Like the “fundamental attribute” element of the Washington analysis, 
the “seeks less to prevent a harm than provide a public benefit” element 
is also undermined by its conceptual roots. The Washington State 
Supreme Court developed this harm-benefit element from substantive 
due process law,
210
 and the Washington Court of Appeals has referred to 
this element as a “due process takings analysis.”
211
 But as explained by 
the U.S. Supreme Court in Lingle in 2005, due process law has no place 
in a takings analysis.
212
 
Furthermore, as a practical matter, the harm-benefit element is 
unworkable. When the Washington State Supreme Court announced it in 
Presbytery, the Court acknowledged “that the determination of whether 
                                                      
aimless doctrine seem inevitable.” Settle, supra note 154, at 402. U.S. Supreme Court takings case 
law after 1989, culminating in Lingle in 2005, did much to provide the guiding principles to federal 
takings law that the article called for in 1989, even if those principles ultimately proved to be 
different from the principles that the article’s author inferred from pre-1989 federal case law. 
208. Presbytery of Seattle v. King Cnty., 114 Wash. 2d 320, 329–30, 787 P.2d 907, 912 (1990). 
209. See Manufactured. Hous. Cmtys. of Wash. v. State, 142 Wash. 2d 347, 363, 13 P.3d 183, 
191 (2000) (treating the Settle article as the source of the “fundamental attribute” element); 
Guimont v. Clarke (Guimont I), 121 Wash. 2d 586, 603, 854 P.2d 1, 8 (1993); Robinson v. City of 
Seattle, 119 Wash. 2d 34, 49–50, 52, 830 P.2d 318, 328–29 (1992). 
210. See Presbytery, 114 Wash. 2d at 329, 787 P.2d at 912; Orion Corp. v. State, 109 Wash. 2d 
621, 650–51, 747 P.2d 1062, 1078 (1987).  
211. Conner v. City of Seattle, 153 Wash. App. 673, 700, 223 P.3d 1201, 1214 (2009), review 
denied, 168 Wash. 2d 1040, 233 P.3d 889 (2010). 
212. See generally supra text accompanying notes 20–31 (discussing Lingle’s role in federal 
takings law). 
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a given regulation seeks to protect the public from harm will not always 
be an easy decision. Both the conferral of benefit and the prevention of 
harm are often present in varying degrees.”
213
 Nevertheless, the 
Washington State Supreme Court adhered to that element.
214
 By 
contrast, the U.S. Supreme Court made a similar observation two years 
later in Lucas and used it to bar a harm-benefit element from entering 
federal takings law. Lucas observed that such an element would call for 
a distinction that “is difficult, if not impossible, to discern on an 
objective, value-free basis . . . .”
215
 “[T]he distinction between ‘harm-
preventing’ and ‘benefit-conferring’ regulation is often in the eye of the 
beholder . . . . Whether one or the other of the competing 
characterizations will come to one’s lips in a particular case depends 
primarily upon one’s evaluation of the worth of competing uses of real 
estate.”
216
 
Although the Washington State Supreme Court altered its takings 
analysis in Guimont I to embrace the “total [regulatory] taking” element 
introduced by Lucas a year earlier,
217
 the Court failed to heed Lucas’s 
apt rejection of a harm-benefit element. The Washington State Supreme 
Court apparently felt it needed even clearer guidance on the question 
from the U.S. Supreme Court: 
Several parties and the concurrence argue this part of the 
[Washington] threshold test is undermined by language in Lucas 
questioning harm versus benefit analysis . . . .We decline to 
address their arguments [because] . . . . it would be premature to 
begin dismantling our takings framework, carefully crafted in 
Presbytery, Sintra, and Robinson, without more definitive 
guidance on this issue from the United States Supreme Court. 
Therefore, we decline to further modify our framework at this 
time and reserve discussion of additional modifications, if any, 
                                                      
213. Presbytery, 114 Wash. 2d at 329 n.13, 787 P.2d at 912 n.13. 
214. Id. (“[T]he initial decision as to whether the predominant goal of the regulation is the 
prevention of a real harm to the public or the conferral of a benefit upon other publicly held 
property must be made according to the facts of each individual case.”); see also Guimont I, 121 
Wash. 2d at 594–95, 600, 603, 854 P.2d at 6, 9, 10–11 (reciting this element in the Washington 
takings analysis). 
215. Lucas v. S.C. Coastal Council, 505 U.S. 1003, 1026 (1992). 
216. Id. at 1024–25. 
217. See Guimont I, 121 Wash. 2d at 594–604, 854 P.2d at 5–11; Eustis, supra note 124, at 1202–
03 (calling, before Guimont I, for the integration of Lucas into the Washington takings analysis). 
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until we are presented with a case that squarely addresses the 
issue.
218
 
Evidently, the Washington State Supreme Court has not yet found the 
opportunity to address this issue. The impractical harm-benefit element 
remains an unwelcome and unworkable fixture of the Washington 
takings analysis. 
3. The “Substantially Advances a Legitimate State Interest” Element 
Has Been Rejected by the U.S. Supreme Court 
Little more need be said about Washington’s “substantially advances 
a legitimate state interest” element than what the U.S. Supreme Court 
said in Lingle when extirpating that element from the federal takings 
analysis.
219
 In sum, Lingle abandoned the very federal case law on which 
Washington courts relied when including the “substantially advances” 
element in the Washington analysis.
220
 
Almost immediately after Lingle was announced in 2005, the 
Washington Court of Appeals noted that Lingle may affect the 
Washington analysis.
221
 The dissenting judge in that case was more 
blunt. She correctly characterized Lingle as rendering the “substantially 
advances” test “doctrinally and practically untenable in takings 
analysis”
222
 and predicted that Lingle would ultimately result in the 
Washington analysis being “replaced by the takings analysis recently 
articulated by the United States Supreme Court in Lingle . . . .”
223
 The 
Washington State Supreme Court, however, has not yet examined the 
import of Lingle for the Washington takings analysis. 
                                                      
218. Guimont I, 121 Wash. 2d at 603 n.5, 854 P.2d at 11 n.5 (citation omitted); accord Margola 
Assocs. v. City of Seattle, 121 Wash. 2d 625, 645 n.7, 854 P.2d 23, 34 n.7 (1993) (nearly identical 
footnote in Guimont I’s companion decision). At the time, some scholars recognized that Lucas 
should have gutted the “seeks less to prevent a harm than provide a public benefit” element of the 
Washington takings analysis. See, e.g., Groen & Stephens, supra note 151, at 1293 (“Lucas directly 
undermines the core component of Washington’s threshold inquiry.”); Elaine Spencer, Dashed 
“Investment-Backed” Expectations: Will the Constitution Protect Property Owners from Excesses 
in Implementation of the Growth Management Act?, 16 U. PUGET SOUND L. REV. 1223, 1229 
(1993); see also Settle, supra note 154, at 373 (noting, even before Lucas, that this element 
“frequently has been criticized as unworkable”). 
219. See generally supra text accompanying notes 20–31 (discussing Lingle). 
220. See Orion Corp. v. State, 109 Wash. 2d 621, 647, 747 P.2d 1062, 1076 (1987) (quoting 
Agins v. Tiburon, 447 U.S. 255, 260 (1980)). 
221. City of Des Moines v. Gray Buss., LLC, 130 Wash. App. 600, 612 n.33, 124 P.3d 324, 330 
n.33 (2005). 
222. Id. at 621, 124 P.3d at 335 (Becker, J., dissenting). 
223. Id. 
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III. THE PATH OUT OF THE QUAGMIRE: ADOPT THE 
FEDERAL ANALYSIS 
The time has come to reform the confounding and unfounded 
Washington takings analysis. Reform would be straightforward: adopt 
the federal takings analysis. Overruling Washington’s takings case law 
would be consistent with the doctrine of stare decisis and the 
Washington State Supreme Court’s professed intent to coordinate 
Washington and federal law. While conceding that it failed to implement 
that intent two decades ago, the Court should also correct its other 
mischaracterizations of the federal takings analysis, and should avoid the 
temptation to justify the Washington takings analysis on independent 
state constitutional grounds for the first time. 
A. The Washington State Supreme Court Can Reverse Course While 
Remaining Consistent with the Doctrine of Stare Decisis and the 
Court’s Original Intent to Track Federal Law 
Abandoning the Washington takings analysis in favor of the federal 
analysis would mean overruling nearly twenty years of Washington case 
law. The doctrine of stare decisis, designed “to accomplish the requisite 
element of stability in court-made law,”
224
 might counsel against such a 
reversal. But that doctrine is not absolute. Courts will abandon an 
established rule of law “when reason so requires” upon a “clear 
showing” that the rule is “incorrect and harmful.”
225
 Nearly two decades 
of experience with the Washington takings analysis prove that it is both 
incorrect and harmful. Among other things, the Washington analysis is a 
failed attempt to coordinate Washington and federal law. This failure has 
left Washington with law that harms not only property owners, whose 
takings claims may be diverted into due process claims more readily 
than under federal law, but also attorneys and federal and lower court 
judges, who must struggle to make sense of a needlessly convoluted 
body of law.
226
 
                                                      
224. In re Rights to Use Waters of Stranger Creek, 77 Wash. 2d 649, 653, 466 P.2d 508, 511 
(1970). 
225. Id. 
226. This is not to suggest that the federal analysis is flawless. By inviting case-by-case 
assessments, the Penn Central factors at the heart of the federal and Washington takings analyses 
continue to insert an element of unpredictability and have long been the subject of pointed critiques. 
See, e.g., Lingle v. Chevron U.S.A., Inc., 544 U.S. 528, 539 (2005) (noting that each of the Penn 
Central factors “has given rise to vexing subsidiary questions”); Spencer, Dashed “Investment-
Backed” Expectations, supra note 218, at 1226–27; Stoebuck, Police Power, Takings, and Due 
Process, supra note 61, at 1069.  
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Rejecting the Washington analysis in favor of the federal analysis 
would not be an abrupt about-face because the Washington State 
Supreme Court always intended to harmonize Washington and federal 
takings law.
227
 In Orion in 1987, this attempt at harmonizing meant 
applying federal case law instead of what the Washington State Supreme 
Court identified as a distinct analysis lurking in Washington case law.
228
 
In subsequent decisions, fostering harmony meant following and 
refining the Washington analysis precisely because the Court believed, 
albeit mistakenly, that Orion had coordinated the Washington and 
federal analyses.
229
 Even though the Court failed to act on its intent 
correctly, that intent remained clear: to apply an analysis at least 
equivalent to the federal analysis. The best way to implement that intent 
is to adopt the federal analysis. 
B. Adopting the Federal Takings Analysis Would Mean Adhering to 
the Language of the Federal Analysis 
Washington takings case law is plagued by mischaracterizations of 
the federal analysis and its elements. These misstatements risk confusing 
readers and tugging Washington law in unintended directions. The 
Washington State Supreme Court would do well to correct these errors 
and avoid similar missteps in the future by adhering to the precise 
language of the federal analysis. 
1. The Penn Central Factors Cannot Be Reduced to a “Balancing 
Test” 
The Washington State Supreme Court miscasts the Penn Central 
factors. Because the U.S. Supreme Court “ha[d] been unable to develop 
any ‘set formula’” for identifying government actions that amount to a 
taking, the Court in Penn Central turned to “essentially ad hoc, factual 
inquiries.”
230
 The primary factors relevant to those inquires are the 
“economic impact of the regulation” on the property owner, the “extent 
                                                      
227. This was clear to at least one federal court, which concluded that “Washington state courts 
have expressed an intent for a regulatory takings analysis to be consistent with the federal 
constitution.” Heitman v. City of Spokane Valley, No. CV-09-0070-FVS, 2010 WL 816727, at *4 
(E.D. Wash. Mar. 5, 2010) (citing Orion Corp. v. State, 109 Wash. 2d 621, 657–58, 747 P.2d 1062, 
1081–82 (1987)). 
228. See supra text accompanying notes 111–14. 
229. See supra text accompanying notes 118–37. 
230. Penn Cent. Transp. Co. v. New York City, 438 U.S. 104, 124 (1978). 
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to which the regulation has interfered with distinct investment-backed 
expectations,” and the “character of the governmental action.”
231
 
The Washington State Supreme Court seemingly fails to appreciate 
that the Penn Central factors cannot be reduced to a formula or test. The 
Court casts the Penn Central factors as implementing a “balancing test” 
in which “[t]he court asks whether the state interest in the regulation is 
outweighed by its adverse economic impact to the landowner.”
232
 
Although the Washington State and U.S. Supreme Courts employ the 
same factors, the U.S. Supreme Court does not share a goal of using 
those factors to answer the ultimate question posed by the Washington 
State Supreme Court: whether the government interest outweighs the 
private impact. 
The Washington State Supreme Court should abandon the “balancing 
test” mischaracterization of the Penn Central factors for the reasons 
described by the U.S. Supreme Court in Lingle. Lingle rejected the 
                                                      
231. Id.; accord Lingle, 544 U.S. at 538–39. 
232. Guimont v. Clarke (Guimont I), 121 Wash. 2d 586, 604, 854 P.2d 1, 11 (1993). Washington 
courts that recite this mischaracterization of the Penn Central factors now cite Guimont I as the 
source. See, e.g., Peste v. Mason Cnty., 133 Wash. App. 456, 473, 136 P.3d 140, 149 (2006) (citing 
Guimont I and Guimont II); Paradise, Inc. v. Pierce Cnty., 124 Wash. App. 759, 767–68, 102 P.3d 
173 (2004) (citing Edmonds Shopping Ctr. Assocs. v. City of Edmonds, 117 Wash. App. 344, 362–
63, 71 P.3d 233, 241 (2003) (citing Guimont I); Edmonds, 117 Wash. App. at 363, 71 P.3d at 241 
(citing Guimont I); Guimont v. City of Seattle (Guimont II), 77 Wash. App. 74, 81, 896 P.2d 70, 
76–77 (1995) (citing Guimont I). 
The source of Washington’s mischaracterization is unclear. The Washington State Supreme Court 
cited no authority for it. See Guimont I, 121 Wash. 2d at 604, 854 P.2d at 11. Although the Court 
cited two of its own precedents as authority for the Penn Central factors, those decisions provide no 
support for characterizing the factors as a “balancing test.” See id. (citing Presbytery of Seattle v. 
King Cnty., 114 Wash. 2d 320, 335–36, 787 P.2d 907, 915 (1990); Robinson v. City of Seattle, 119 
Wash. 2d 34, 51, 830 P.2d 318, 328 (1992)). To the extent those precedents discussed a balancing 
test, those discussions were in the context of substantive due process claims, not takings claims. 
Presbytery, 114 Wash. 2d at 330–31, 787 P.2d at 912–13; Robinson, 119 Wash. 2d at 51–52, 830 
P.2d at 328–29. Whether this means that the Washington State Supreme Court mistakenly 
transposed the “balancing test” from substantive due process case law and the Washington takings 
analysis remains a matter of speculation. 
 Even if not attributed to a particular source, the “balancing test” mischaracterization might not 
have been plucked from thin air. One other reference to a balancing test can be found in the case 
law that led to the current Washington takings analysis. Orion reported that, under the federal 
takings analysis, a taking can result “if the property owner suffers an economic deprivation 
significant enough to outweigh the public interest served by the regulation.” Orion, 109 Wash. 2d at 
655, 747 P.2d at 1080; see also id., 109 Wash. 2d at 647, 747 P.2d at 1076 (similar statement). For 
that proposition, Orion cited Keystone, in which the U.S. Supreme Court quoted Agins as saying 
that the question of whether a taking has occurred “necessarily requires a weighing of private and 
public interests.” See Keystone Bituminous Coal Ass’n v. DeBenedictis, 480 U.S. 470, 492 (1987) 
(quoting Agins v. Tiburon, 447 U.S. 255, 260–261 (1980)). Whether that means that Agins—which 
Lingle ultimately ejected from federal takings law, see supra text accompanying notes 20–31—was 
the ultimate source of the “balancing test” mischaracterization also remains speculative. 
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notion that a court should consider a regulation’s ability to advance the 
public interest when assessing whether the regulation effects a taking.
233
 
Instead, the Penn Central factors, like the other elements of the federal 
takings analysis, “focus[] directly upon the severity of the burden that 
government imposes upon private property rights.”
234
 To measure that 
burden, the Penn Central factors “turn[] in large part, albeit not 
exclusively, upon the magnitude of a regulation’s economic impact and 
the degree to which it interferes with legitimate property interests.”
235
 
On its face, the Penn Central factor that probes the character of the 
government action
236
 might seem to invite an assessment of the public 
interest in that action. But this factor considers only the severity of the 
burden on the property owner, asking whether the burden is more like an 
ouster from one’s domain (which a court may find more readily to be a 
taking) than “some public program adjusting the benefits and burdens of 
economic life to promote the common good” (which is less likely to be a 
taking).
237
 Because that inquiry omits any consideration of the public 
interest, there is no basis for characterizing this Penn Central factor as 
placing the common good and private impact on opposite sides of a scale 
to gauge their relative weight. 
2. The Federal Analysis Cannot Be Summarized as an Assessment of 
Whether a Burden Should, “In All Fairness and Justice,” Be Borne 
by the Public as a Whole 
As part of a reform of Washington takings law, the Washington State 
Supreme Court should disavow another mischaracterization of federal 
law that threatens to creep into Washington case law. Quoting the U.S. 
Supreme Court’s decision in Armstrong v. United States,
238
 the 
Washington State Supreme Court stated in Mission Springs, Inc. v. City 
of Spokane
239
 that “[t]he talisman of a taking is government action which 
forces some private persons alone to shoulder affirmative public 
                                                      
233. See, e.g., Lingle, 544 U.S. at 543 (“The notion that . . . a regulation . . . ‘takes’ private 
property for public use merely by virtue of its ineffectiveness or foolishness is untenable.”); see 
generally id. at 542–43. 
234. Id. at 539. 
235. Id. at 540. 
236. Penn Cent., 438 U.S. at 124. 
237. Id.; accord Lingle, 544 U.S. at 539 (“Each [element in the federal takings analysis] aims to 
identify regulatory actions that are functionally equivalent to the classic taking in which government 
directly appropriates private property or ousts the owner from his domain.”). 
238. 364 U.S. 40 (1960). 
239. 134 Wash. 2d 947, 954 P.2d 250 (1998). 
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burdens, ‘which, in all fairness and justice, should be borne by the public 
as a whole.’”
240
 
This “talisman” has so far gained no additional traction. Mission 
Springs remains the only majority opinion in which the Court 
proclaimed this “in all fairness and justice” takings litmus test.
241
 This is 
not surprising because Mission Springs turned solely on a due process 
claim.
242
 
The Washington State Supreme Court should continue to ignore this 
“talisman,” no matter how pithy it might appear, for four reasons. First, 
the “in all fairness and justice” test arises from dictum in Armstrong, 
which was decided in 1960 and does not reflect a half century of 
subsequent federal takings case law. Even under takings jurisprudence 
then in effect, the U.S. Supreme Court did not invoke “in all fairness and 
justice” to resolve Armstrong. That case involved a straightforward 
claim by a subcontractor on a shipbuilding project.
243
 At the time the 
federal government took possession of certain hulls under construction, 
the subcontractor had not been paid, so it asserted liens under state law 
for materials it furnished to the project’s prime contractor.
244
 The federal 
government refused to honor the liens.
245
 The U.S. Supreme Court sided 
with the subcontractor for the unremarkable reason that “[t]he total 
destruction by the Government of all value of these liens, which 
constitute compensable property, has every possible element of a Fifth 
Amendment ‘taking[,]’”
246
 giving rise to the “constitutional obligation to 
pay just compensation for the value of the liens the petitioners lost and 
of which loss the Government was the direct, positive beneficiary.”
247
 
None of this reasoning involved determining whether the 
subcontractor was bearing a burden that society as a whole should bear. 
                                                      
240. Id. at 964, 954 P.2d at 258 (quoting Armstrong, 364 U.S. at 49). 
241. The author of the majority opinion in Mission Springs continued to cite this test as a holding 
in several of his concurring and dissenting opinions. E.g., Eggleston v. Pierce Cnty., 148 Wash. 2d 
760, 779, 64 P.3d 618, 629 (2002) (Sanders, J., dissenting); Asarco, Inc. v. Dep’t of Ecology, 145 
Wash. 2d 750, 777–82, 43 P.3d 471, 484–86 (2001) (Sanders, J., dissenting); Manufactured. Hous. 
Cmtys. of Wash. v. State, 142 Wash. 2d 347, 381, 13 P.3d 183, 200 (2000) (Sanders, J., 
concurring). 
242. See, e.g., Mission Springs, 134 Wash. 2d at 963, 954 P.2d at 257 (“This situation must be 
analyzed under well-established due process criteria as distinguished from that associated with 
taking property without just compensation.”). 
243. Armstrong, 364 U.S. at 41. 
244. Id. 
245. Id. at 41–42. 
246. Id. at 48. 
247. Id. at 49. 
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Because Armstrong was a simple case of government paying for what it 
appropriates, Armstrong is consistent with Lingle’s statement forty-five 
years later of the “touchstone” of a taking: “actions that are functionally 
equivalent to the classic taking in which government directly 
appropriates private property . . . .”
248
 It is only in Armstrong’s 
concluding paragraph that the Court indulged in a rhetorical flourish 
about the “design” or purpose of the federal Takings Clause.
249
 The 
Court cited no authority for this indulgence, and followed it immediately 
with a statement that resolution of the case turned on the Court’s 
interpretation of the Fifth Amendment itself, not on some intent lurking 
in that provision’s design: 
The Fifth Amendment’s guarantee that private property shall not 
be taken for a public use without just compensation was 
designed to bar Government from forcing some people alone to 
bear public burdens which, in all fairness and justice, should be 
borne by the public as a whole. A fair interpretation of this 
constitutional protection entitles these lienholders to just 
compensation here.
250
 
Second, even though federal and Washington courts have repeated 
Armstrong’s statement about the design or purpose of the Takings 
Clause,
251
 and even though a desire to advance that purpose arguably 
motivated what became the Penn Central factors in the federal takings 
analysis,
252
 the U.S. Supreme Court expressly rejected Armstrong’s “in 
                                                      
248. Lingle v. Chevron U.S.A., Inc., 544 U.S. 528, 539 (2005). 
249. Armstrong, 364 U.S. at 49. 
250. Id. (emphasis added). 
251. E.g., Palazzolo v. Rhode Island, 533 U.S. 606, 617–18 (2001) (noting the inquiries that 
make up the federal takings analysis “are informed by the purpose of the Takings Clause”); E. 
Enters. v. Apfel, 524 U.S. 498, 522 (1998) (describing the “aim” of the Federal Takings Clause); 
Dolan v. City of Tigard, 512 U.S. 374, 384 (1994) (describing the “principal purposes” of the 
Takings Clause); Nollan v. Cal. Coastal Comm’n, 483 U.S. 825, 835 n.4 (1987) (same); First 
English Evangelical Lutheran Church v. Cnty. of L.A., 482 U.S. 304, 318–19 (1987) (describing the 
“design[]” of the Takings Clause); Manufactured Hous. Cmtys. of Wash. v. State, 142 Wash. 2d 
347, 371, 13 P.3d 183 (2000) (describing the “design[]” of the Takings Clause, not a test through 
which to apply that clause); Orion Corp. v. State, 109 Wash. 2d 621, 648–49, 747 P.2d 1062 (1987) 
(using “justice and fairness” to describe the “primary problem” with excessive regulation, which 
can be addressed either through a takings analysis or a due process analysis); In re 14255 53rd Ave. 
S., 120 Wash. App. 737, 748–49, 86 P.3d 222, 227 (2004) (declining to apply “all fairness and 
justice” as a takings element); Benchmark Land Co. v. City of Battle Ground, 103 Wash. App. 721, 
724–25, 14 P.3d 172 (2000) (describing the “purpose” of the Takings Clause, not a test for it); 
Burton v. Clark Cnty., 91 Wash. App. 505, 515, 958 P.2d 343, 350 (1998) (same). 
252. See Yee v. City of Escondido, 503 U.S. 519, 522–23 (1992); Penn Cent. Transp. Co. v. New 
York City, 438 U.S. 104, 123–24 (1978). Two scholars characterize this case law as the Court 
“stress[ing] the importance of determining whether the government action unfairly shifts public 
burdens onto private individuals.” Groen & Stephens, supra note 151, at 1281. However, a closer 
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all fairness and justice” language as a test in the federal takings analysis. 
Although Lingle quoted Armstrong as a justification for the federal 
takings test,
253
 Lingle rejected an attempt to use Armstrong as part of the 
test itself: 
[The property owner] appeals to the general principle that the 
Takings Clause is meant “‘to bar Government from forcing 
some people alone to bear public burdens which, in all fairness 
and justice, should be borne by the public as a whole.’” But that 
appeal is clearly misplaced . . . [because a] test that tells us 
nothing about the actual burden imposed on property rights, or 
how that burden is allocated, cannot tell us when justice might 
require that the burden be spread among taxpayers through the 
payment of compensation.
254
 
Instead of a test that identifies what burdens should properly be borne by 
the public as a whole, Lingle says that the primary touchstone of takings 
law is a test that discerns “regulatory actions that are functionally 
equivalent to the classic taking in which government directly 
appropriates private property or ousts the owner from his domain.”
255
 
Instead of first probing the justification for or distribution of the burden, 
the focus must be “directly upon the severity of the burden that 
government imposes upon private property rights.”
256
 That focus is 
consistent with the U.S. Supreme Court’s conclusion that any 
compensation required by the Takings Clause “is measured by the 
property owner’s loss rather than the government’s gain.”
257
 It does not 
matter what the government gets from the taking or even whether the 
government should have secured it from others. What matters is that the 
government pays the property owner the value of the property lost by the 
owner. 
                                                      
reading of this case law reveals that the U.S. Supreme Court, while keeping an eye on the framers’ 
intent of ensuring fair distribution of burdens within society, developed the Penn Central factors 
precisely because the Court did not want to make unbounded determinations about “justice and 
fairness” in a given case—just as it could not derive a “set formula” that would rigidly dictate all 
cases. See Penn Cent., 438 U.S. at 124 (“[T]his Court, quite simply, has been unable to develop any 
‘set formula’ for determining when ‘justice and fairness’ require that economic injuries caused by 
public action be compensated by the government, rather than remain disproportionately 
concentrated on a few persons.”). 
253. Lingle, 544 U.S. at 537. 
254. Id. at 542–43 (citation omitted). 
255. Id. at 539. 
256. Id. (emphasis added). 
257. Brown v. Legal Found. of Wash., 538 U.S. 216, 235–36 (2003). 
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Finally, “in all fairness and justice” is too subjective to use as a 
constitutional test. A former Washington State Supreme Court justice 
illustrated this point by once dissenting on the grounds that “fairness and 
justice” required a finding of a taking:
258
 “I would conclude by any 
traditional notion of justice . . . [that the situation presented by the 
plaintiff] deeply offends fundamental notions of fairness and justice.”
259
 
A constitutional test should rely on more than sticking one’s fingers into 
the wind of “traditional notions” of fairness and justice to probe the 
depth of a perceived offense. 
3. Other Misstatements of the Federal Elements Are Needlessly 
Confusing 
Other misstatements of the federal takings analysis lurk in 
Washington case law. For example, although federal courts use one of 
the Penn Central factors to consider the economic impact of the 
challenged regulation on the property owner,
260
 Washington courts 
purport to use that factor to consider the economic impact on the 
property itself.
261
 
Another error occurs in Washington’s version of the “total 
[regulatory] taking” element. Federal courts ask whether government 
action deprives the property owner of all economically “beneficial” 
use,
262
 but Washington courts ask whether the action deprives the owner 
of all economically “viable” use.
263
 
                                                      
258. Asarco, Inc. v. Dep’t of Ecology, 145 Wash. 2d 750, 777–82, 43 P.3d 471, 484–86 (2001) 
(Sanders, J., dissenting). 
259. Id. at 779, 43 P.3d at 485. 
260. See, e.g., Penn Cent. Transp. Co. v. New York City, 438 U.S. 104, 124 (1978); Lingle, 544 
U.S. at 538–39. 
261. See, e.g., Guimont v. Clarke (Guimont I), 121 Wash. 2d 586, 596, 854 P.2d 1, 6 (1993); 
Presbytery of Seattle v. King Cnty., 114 Wash. 2d 320, 335, 787 P.2d 907, 915 (1990). 
262. Lingle, 544 U.S. at 538; Lucas v. S.C. Coastal Council, 505 U.S. 1003, 1019 (1992). The 
U.S. and Washington State Supreme Courts initially used “viable” in the context of the Penn 
Central factors. See, e.g., Keystone Bituminous Coal Ass’n v. DeBenedictis, 480 U.S. 470, 495 
(1987) (quoting Agins v. Tiburon, 447 U.S. 255, 260 (1980)); Penn Cent., 438 U.S. at 138 n.36; 
Presbytery, 114 Wash. 2d at 333–34, 787 P.2d at 914; Orion Corp. v. State, 109 Wash. 2d 621, 655–
56, 747 P.2d 1062, 1081 (1987). The U.S. Supreme Court ceased that practice in Lucas—the 1992 
decision that added the “total taking” element to the federal analysis. Lucas, 505 U.S. at 1019, 
1030–31. Since Lucas, that element has employed the term “beneficial,” not “viable.” See, e.g., Stop 
the Beach Renourishment, Inc. v. Fla. Dep’t of Envtl. Prot., ___ U.S. ___, 130 S. Ct. 2592, 2601 
(2010); Lingle, 544 U.S. at 538; Palazzolo v. Rhode Island, 533 U.S. 606, 617 (2001). 
263. Guimont I, 121 Wash. 2d at 600, 602, 605, 854 P.2d at 9, 10, 12; Margola Assocs. v. City of 
Seattle, 121 Wash. 2d 625, 643–44, 854 P.2d 23, 33 (1993). When incorporating Lucas into the 
Washington takings analysis, the Washington State Supreme Court appeared to appreciate that 
Lucas used “beneficial.” Guimont I, 121 Wash. 2d at 598, 599, 854 P.2d at 8 (quoting Lucas). 
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Although these misstatements are unlikely to yield results 
substantively different from ones produced by application of the exact 
language of the federal analysis, they remain confusing and likely 
unintended points of departure between federal and Washington takings 
law. They highlight the need for the Washington State Supreme Court to 
exercise care when reciting federal takings law. 
C. Attempting to Justify the Washington Takings Analysis on 
Independent State Constitutional Grounds Would Be Unwarranted 
Historically and Legally 
The Washington takings analysis has always been an attempt, 
however ill-fated, to track the federal analysis. When the Washington 
State Supreme Court revisits its takings jurisprudence, it should not 
attempt to justify its twenty-year-old takings analysis on independent 
state constitutional grounds. Such an attempt would ignore history and 
should fail on its merits. 
1. The Washington State Supreme Court Never Performed a Gunwall 
Analysis to Justify Its Unique Takings Analysis 
Like all state courts, the Washington State Supreme Court is free to 
interpret its state constitution to provide greater protection for individual 
rights than does the U.S. Constitution. As explained in the Court’s well-
worn Gunwall
264
 decision, “states can do this because each state has the 
‘sovereign right to adopt in its own Constitution individual liberties 
more expansive than those conferred by the Federal Constitution.’”
265
 
Creating distinct state constitutional law is the exception, not the rule. 
The Washington State Supreme Court deems it “self evident 
that . . . . state courts should be sensitive to developments in federal 
law,” because “[t]he opinions of the [U.S.] Supreme Court, while not 
controlling on state courts construing their own constitutions, are 
nevertheless important guides on the subjects which they squarely 
address.”
266
 The Washington State Supreme Court therefore resolved 
                                                      
Nevertheless, without explanation, the Court reverted to “viable” in its statement of the Washington 
takings analysis. Id. at 600, 602, 605, 854 P.2d at 9, 10, 12; see also Margola, 121 Wash. 2d at 643–
44, 854 P.2d at 33. 
264. State v. Gunwall, 106 Wash. 2d 54, 720 P.2d 808 (1986). 
265. Id. at 59, 720 P.2d at 811 (quoting Pruneyard Shopping Ctr. v. Robins, 447 U.S. 74, 81 
(1980)). 
266. Id. at 60–61, 720 P.2d at 812 (quoting State v. Hunt, 450 A.2d 952, 964 (N.J. Sup. Ct. 1982) 
(Handler, J., concurring)). The Washington State Supreme Court has criticized state courts that fail 
to explain why they diverge from federal constitutional precedent: “The difficulty with such 
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that “[r]ecourse to our state constitution as an independent source for 
recognizing and protecting the individual rights of our citizens must 
spring not from pure intuition, but from a process that is at once 
articulable, reasonable and reasoned.”
267
 Heeding this lesson, the 
Washington State Supreme Court will analyze six nonexclusive 
criteria—often called the “Gunwall factors”—before deciding to part 
ways with federal case law on matters of constitutional interpretation.
268
 
An attempt to use Gunwall to support the Washington takings 
analysis now, more than two decades after its creation, would be an 
attempt to rewrite history. The Washington State Supreme Court has 
never applied the Gunwall factors to assess whether the Washington 
State Constitution offers greater protections to individuals against 
uncompensated takings for public use, and thus whether a different 
Washington takings analysis is appropriate. Even though Orion, which 
spawned the Washington takings analysis, was decided fewer than two 
years after Gunwall itself, Orion did not cite Gunwall.
269
 Guimont I, 
which effectively capped the Court’s development of the Washington 
takings analysis in 1993,
270
 did not consider the property “owners’ 
arguments that the state constitution provides greater protection” 
because they had “not briefed the relevant Gunwall factors necessary for 
determining whether an independent analysis of the state constitution is 
proper.”
271
 The Washington Court of Appeals has frequently noted the 
                                                      
decisions is that they establish no principled basis for repudiating federal precedent and thus furnish 
little or no rational basis for counsel to predict the future course of state decisional law.” Id. at 60, 
720 P.2d at 811–12. 
267. Id. at 63, 720 P.2d at 813; see also id. at 62–63, 720 P.2d at 813 (stating the Court’s intent to 
“use independent state constitutional grounds in a given situation” only “for well founded legal 
reasons and not by merely substituting [its] notion of justice for that of . . . the United States 
Supreme Court”). 
268. Id. at 61–62, 720 P.2d at 812–13. The Washington State Supreme Court characterized the 
six criteria as “neutral” and summarized them as: “(1) the textual language; (2) differences in the 
texts; (3) constitutional history; (4) preexisting state law; (5) structural differences; and (6) matters 
of particular state or local concern.” Id. at 58. 
269. See Manufactured Hous. Cmtys. of Wash. v. State, 142 Wash. 2d 347, 356 n.7, 13 P.3d 183, 
187 n.7 (2000) (“[A]lthough Orion was decided 18 months after Gunwall, it makes no reference to 
Gunwall.”). 
270. See Sintra, Inc. v. City of Seattle (Sintra II), 131 Wash. 2d 640, 676–77, 935 P.2d 555, 574 
(1997) (Durham, C.J., concurring) (noting that no reconfiguration of the Washington analysis was 
needed after 1993 because Guimont I had already integrated the latest U.S. Supreme Court takings 
case law). 
271. Guimont v. Clarke (Guimont I), 121 Wash. 2d 586, 604, 854 P.2d 1, 11 (1993); accord 
Manufactured Hous., 142 Wash. 2d at 356 n.7, 13 P.3d at 187 n.7 (“[T]he Guimont court 
specifically declined to undertake a state constitutional Gunwall analysis.”). 
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absence or insufficiency of any attempt to discern broader state takings 
protections through application of the Gunwall factors.
272
 
A trio of Washington State Supreme Court decisions nevertheless 
appears to suggest that an application of the Gunwall factors supports 
the Washington takings analysis. Those suggestions prove unconvincing 
under closer inspection. 
The first of this trio is Manufactured Housing Communities of 
Washington v. State (Manufactured Housing).
273
 There, a plurality of the 
Court
274
 invalidated a statute because it purported to authorize the 
government to take property for a purpose not authorized by the 
Washington State Constitution.
275
 Although the U.S. Supreme Court 
reads the U.S. Constitution to authorize takings that advance what a 
legislative body determines to be a public purpose,
276
 the Washington 
State Supreme Court has long held that the Washington State 
Constitution authorizes takings only for a narrower set of purposes that 
may be deemed a direct public use.
277
 Manufactured Housing applied the 
                                                      
272. See, e.g., Schreiner Farms, Inc. v. Smitch, 87 Wash. App. 27, 32–33, 940 P.2d 274, 276–77 
(1997) (noting the continued absence of any Gunwall analysis); Guimont v. City of Seattle 
(Guimont II), 77 Wash. App. 74, 79 n.4, 896 P.2d 70, 75 n.4 (1995) (“Although [the property 
owner] argues that the state constitution affords greater protection to property owners than does the 
federal constitution, its argument on the Gunwall factors does not support an independent state 
constitutional analysis.”). 
273. 142 Wash. 2d 347, 13 P.3d 183 (2000). 
274. See id. at 375, 13 P.3d at 197 (showing only three justices concurring in the lead opinion, 
with one justice concurring in the result). 
275. Id. at 374, 13 P.3d at 196. 
276. Kelo v. City of New London, 545 U.S. 469, 479–80 (2005). 
277. This law was established well before the advent of the Gunwall factors in 1986. See, e.g., 
Petition of City of Seattle, 96 Wash. 2d 616, 624, 638 P.2d 549, 554–55 (1981); Hogue v. Port of 
Seattle, 54 Wash. 2d 799, 813, 341 P.2d 171, 178 (1959); State ex rel. Or.–Wash. R.R. & 
Navigation Co. v. Superior Court, 155 Wash. 651, 657–58, 286 P. 33, 36 (1930). 
This law stemmed from three crucial differences between the federal and Washington takings 
provisions. First, the Washington provision adds a key limitation: “Private property shall not be 
taken for private use . . . .” WASH. CONST. art. I, § 16 (amended 1920) (emphasis added). This 
provision alone makes it much more difficult under the Washington State Constitution for a local 
government to condemn private property and convey it to a different set of private hands. 
Second, the Washington State Constitution accords no deference to legislative judgment in 
determining what constitutes a “public use.” Id. (“Whenever an attempt is made to take private 
property for a use alleged to be public, the question whether the contemplated use be really public 
shall be a judicial question, and determined as such, without regard to any legislative assertion that 
the use is public . . . .”); cf. Kelo, 545 U.S. at 480–83 (deferring largely to a local determination of a 
public purpose). 
 Finally, the Washington State Constitution has been frequently amended to define certain 
activities as “public uses.” This suggests that, but for these express examples, “public use” has a 
relatively narrow meaning under Washington law. See, e.g., WASH. CONST. art. I, § 16 (amended 
1920) (“[T]he taking of private property by the state for land reclamation and settlement purposes is 
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Gunwall factors to reaffirm that long-understood difference between 
federal and state law on the issue of whether the government may take 
property at all, even if the government pays compensation.
278
 
Manufactured Housing did not employ Gunwall to justify a unique 
Washington analysis for determining whether the government has 
actually taken property.
279
 
In the second case of the trio, Eggleston v. Pierce County,
280
 the 
Washington State Supreme Court exaggerated the reach of 
Manufactured Housing’s Gunwall analysis. In Eggleston, the Court 
faced the issue of whether damage to a home caused by police gathering 
evidence pursuant to a search warrant constituted a taking for which 
compensation had to be paid.
281
 Even though the Court resolved the case 
by applying Washington law rather than federal law, the Court did not 
apply the Washington takings analysis.
282
 Instead, the Court looked to 
“the principles underlying [its] jurisprudence” (namely, that an exercise 
of the police power cannot be a taking)
283
 and “evidence from an 1886 
Oregon Supreme Court case” to conclude that, when the Washington 
State Constitution was adopted in 1889, “the production of 
evidence . . . would not have been considered a taking.”
284
 Among its 
reasons for omitting the requisite Gunwall analysis, the Court cited 
                                                      
hereby declared to be for public use.”); WASH. CONST. art. VIII, § 8 (amended 1966) (“The use of 
public funds by port districts in such manner as may be prescribed by the legislature for industrial 
development or trade promotion . . . shall be deemed a public use for a public purpose . . . .”); 
WASH. CONST. art. VIII, § 11 (amended 1985) (“The use of agricultural commodity assessments by 
agricultural commodity commissions in such manner as may be prescribed by the legislature for 
agricultural development or trade promotion and promotional hosting shall be deemed a public use 
for a public purpose . . . .”). 
278. Manufactured Hous. Cmtys. of Wash. v. State, 142 Wash. 2d 347, 356–61, 13 P.3d 183, 
187–90 (2000). 
279. Consistent with Manufactured Housing’s limited scope, the Washington State Supreme 
Court three months later declined, in the absence of a Gunwall analysis, to address whether “the 
Washington Takings Clause should be interpreted more expansively than its federal counterpart” 
when addressing a claim that a taking actually occurred. Dean v. Lehman, 143 Wash. 2d 12, 33, 18 
P.3d 523, 535 (2001). Dean involved a claim that a user fee constituted a taking “in the nature of a 
monetary exaction.” Id. at 31–32, 18 P.3d at 534. That claim is subject to a different analysis than 
the one at issue in this Article. See id. Dean is nevertheless relevant because it belies later 
contentions by the Court that Manufactured Housing obviated future Gunwall analyses of the 
differences between the federal and Washington takings clauses. See infra text accompanying notes 
280–90. 
280. 148 Wash. 2d 760, 64 P.3d 618 (2002). 
281. Id. at 763, 64 P.3d at 620. 
282. Other than citing Guimont I among a string of other cases, Eggleston did not mention the 
Washington takings analysis. See id. at 767, 64 P.3d at 622. 
283. This principle is described and critiqued above. See supra Part II.B. 
284. Eggleston, 148 Wash. 2d at 769, 64 P.3d at 623. 
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Manufactured Housing as though it had already satisfied Gunwall’s 
requirements.
285
 The Court concluded that “the threshold function 
Gunwall performs is less necessary when we have already established a 
state constitutional provision provides more protection than its federal 
counterpart.”
286
 
In the final decision of the trio, Brutsche v. City of Kent,
287
 the 
Washington State Supreme Court attempted to obviate a Gunwall 
analysis for all takings issues. Because Brutsche presented the same 
issue resolved in Eggleston, the Court resolved Brutsche primarily by 
holding that Eggleston was both indistinguishable as a factual matter and 
correct as a legal matter.
288
 In a footnote, Brutsche rehashed Eggleston’s 
reasons for not performing a Gunwall analysis.
289
 The Court concluded 
by signaling that it saw no need to apply the Gunwall factors to 
Washington’s takings clause: “Because it is settled that article I, section 
16 is to be given independent effect, it is unnecessary to engage in a 
Gunwall analysis.”
290
 Unfortunately, as demonstrated by a reading of 
Manufactured Housing and Eggleston, no court has addressed, let alone 
settled, the matter of whether Washington’s takings clause justifies the 
unique Washington takings analysis. 
The actual foundation of the Washington analysis is a mistaken belief 
that it is equivalent to the federal analysis.
291
 The Washington State 
                                                      
285. Id. at 766, 64 P.3d at 622 (citing Manufactured Housing Communities of Washington v. 
State, 142 Wash. 2d 347, 356 n.7, 13 P.3d 183, 187 n.7 (2000), for the proposition that the 
Washington takings clause “is significantly different from its United States constitutional 
counterpart, and in some ways provides greater protection.”). It is difficult to square that statement 
with the Washington State Supreme Court’s 1987 conclusion that “the federal approach [to takings] 
may in some instance provide broader protection” than the Washington approach. Orion Corp. v. 
State, 109 Wash. 2d 621, 657, 747 P.2d 1062, 1082 (1987). 
286. Eggleston, 148 Wash. 2d at 767 n.5, 64 P.3d at 622 n.5. Among other reasons for excusing 
the requisite Gunwall analysis, the Court reported that “a satisfactory Gunwall analysis was 
provided by an amicus.” Id. The Court omitted the fact that the amicus brief focused on the import 
of the phrase “or damaged” in the Washington State Constitution—a phrase not employed in 
Eggleston or ever invoked to justify the Washington takings analysis. See Brief of Amicus Curiae 
American Civil Liberties Union of Washington, Eggleston, 148 Wash. 2d 760, 64 P.3d 618 (2003) 
(No. 71296-4), 2002 WL 33003998, at *14–20. The Washington takings clause reads: “No private 
property shall be taken or damaged for public or private use without just compensation having been 
first made . . . .” WASH. CONST. art. I, § 16 (amended 1920) (emphasis added). For a discussion of 
whether “or damaged” could be a basis for the unique Washington takings analysis, see infra text 
accompanying note 300. 
287. 164 Wash. 2d 664, 193 P.3d 110 (2008). 
288. Id. at 680–82, 193 P.3d at 119–20. 
289. Id. at 680 n.11, 193 P.3d at 119–20 n.11. 
290. Id. 
291. See supra text accompanying notes 111–22, 228–29. 
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Supreme Court should not compound that mistake by attempting to 
justify the Washington takings analysis as the product of a 
Gunwall analysis. 
2. The Gunwall Factors, Even if Applied to Washington’s Takings 
Clause, Would Likely Not Justify the Washington Takings Analysis 
Even if the Washington State Supreme Court were to perform a 
Gunwall analysis now, there is little reason to think that it would justify 
a unique Washington takings analysis, especially not the particular 
analysis the Court finished creating in 1993. There is no need to belabor 
this point with a complete Gunwall analysis, especially when 
Washington courts have consciously developed and applied the 
Washington takings analysis for two decades in the absence of a relevant 
Gunwall analysis.
292
 Two considerations cast serious doubt on 
Gunwall’s ability to justify the Washington takings analysis. 
First, a basic premise of Gunwall is that it identifies situations where 
“the constitution of the State of Washington should be considered as 
extending broader rights to its citizens than does the United States 
Constitution.”
293
 Yet when explaining the Washington takings analysis, 
the Washington State Supreme Court first stated that “the breadth of 
constitutional protection under the state and federal just compensation 
clauses remains virtually identical,”
294
 and then proclaimed that “[t]he 
Washington Constitution provides the same right” as the Federal 
Takings Clause.
295
 More crucially, by deliberately enhancing protection 
of government, the Washington analysis provides narrower protection to 
individuals,
296
 not the broader protection fostered by Gunwall. Without 
turning Gunwall on its head, the Washington State Supreme Court 
cannot now point to the Washington State Constitution to justify a 
twenty-year-old analysis that restricts rights afforded by the U.S. 
Constitution. 
                                                      
292. See supra text accompanying notes 269–72. 
293. State v. Gunwall, 106 Wash. 2d 54, 61, 720 P.2d 808, 812 (1986).  
294. Orion Corp. v. State, 109 Wash. 2d 621, 657, 747 P.2d 1062, 1082 (1987). 
295. Sintra v. City of Seattle (Sintra I), 119 Wash. 2d 1, 13, 829 P.2d 765, 772 (1992); accord 
Eustis, supra note 124, at 1193 n.79 (“The Washington State Supreme Court has construed the state 
constitutional provision to be identical to that of the federal Constitution.”). The Court added: “State 
law may provide useful guidance in this determination, but federal law is ultimately controlling.” 
Sintra I, 119 Wash. 2d at 14, 829 P.2d at 772. 
296. See supra text accompanying notes 183–95 (discussing why the Washington analysis is 
insufficient under the U.S. Constitution). 
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Second, the Gunwall factor that assesses differences in the relevant 
texts of the two constitutions suggests no basis for an independent 
Washington analysis.
297
 When determining whether a government action 
constitutes a taking requiring compensation, there are no significant 
differences in the Takings Clauses of the U.S. and Washington State 
Constitutions. The federal provision reads: “[N]or shall private property 
be taken for public use, without just compensation.”
298
 Stripped to its 
essence, the parallel Washington provision is functionally identical: “No 
private property shall be taken or damaged for public or private use 
without just compensation having been first made . . . .”
299
 Even though 
the Washington takings provision includes the words “or damaged,” the 
Washington State Supreme Court has noted that “no Washington 
decision has attached significance to the difference in language in the 
context of police power regulation,” and suggested that “or damaged” 
might have more to do with tort law than takings law.
300
 To the extent 
                                                      
297. See Gunwall, 106 Wash. 2d at 58, 720 P.2d at 811. 
298. U.S. CONST. amend. V. 
299. WASH. CONST. art. I, § 16 (amended 1920). In full and in context, the Washington takings 
clause reads: 
Private property shall not be taken for private use, except for private ways of necessity, and for 
drains, flumes, or ditches on or across the lands of others for agricultural, domestic, or sanitary 
purposes. No private property shall be taken or damaged for public or private use without just 
compensation having been first made, or paid into court for the owner, and no right-of-way 
shall be appropriated to the use of any corporation other than municipal until full compensation 
therefor be first made in money, or ascertained and paid into court for the owner, irrespective 
of any benefit from any improvement proposed by such corporation, which compensation shall 
be ascertained by a jury, unless a jury be waived, as in other civil cases in courts of record, in 
the manner prescribed by law. Whenever an attempt is made to take private property for a use 
alleged to be public, the question whether the contemplated use be really public shall be a 
judicial question, and determined as such, without regard to any legislative assertion that the 
use is public: Provided, That the taking of private property by the state for land reclamation 
and settlement purposes is hereby declared to be for public use. 
Id. (emphasis added). The addition of “or private use” is relevant to the range of purposes for which 
the government may take property; that phrase is irrelevant to whether a taking has occurred. See 
supra notes 276–79 and accompanying text. On its face, the requirement that compensation be made 
“first” is relevant only to the timing of the compensation, not to whether any compensation is due. 
300. Presbytery of Seattle v. King Cnty., 114 Wash. 2d 320, 328 n.10, 787 P.2d 907, 911 n.10 
(1990); accord Schreiner Farms, Inc. v. Smitch, 87 Wash. App. 27, 32, 940 P.2d 274, 276–77 
(1997); Settle, supra note 154, at 344. A line of Washington authority relies on the “or damaged” 
language in the conceptually distinct situation of government road work substantially impairing 
access to one’s property. See, e.g., Pande Cameron & Co. of Seattle, Inc. v. Cent. Puget Sound 
Reg’l Transit Auth., 610 F. Supp. 2d 1288, 1303–06 (W.D. Wash. 2009), aff’d, 376 F. App’x 672 
(9th Cir. 2010) (applying Washington law); Keiffer v. King Cnty., 89 Wash. 2d 369, 372, 572 P.2d 
408, 410 (1977); Walker v. State, 48 Wash. 2d 587, 589–90, 295 P.2d 328, 330 (1956); Brown v. 
City of Seattle, 5 Wash. 35, 38–41, 31 P. 313, 314–15 (1892); see William B. Stoebuck, A General 
Theory of Eminent Domain, 47 WASH. L. REV. 553, 555 n.8 (1972) (noting the presence of “or 
damaged” in twenty-six state constitutions, tracing its origin to Illinois, and explaining that it was 
“intended to liberalize the allowance of compensation for loss of certain kinds of property rights, 
particularly street access”). 
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“or damaged” actually injects notions of tort liability into takings 
jurisprudence, that concept is not unique to Washington. Despite the 
absence of “or damaged” from the Federal Takings Clause, the U.S. 
Supreme Court has held that “when the government uses its own 
property in such a way that it destroys private property, it has taken that 
property.”
301
 
CONCLUSION 
In evaluating whether to abandon the Washington takings analysis, 
Lingle remains instructive. After examining a twenty-five-year-old 
element of its takings analysis, a unanimous U.S. Supreme Court 
admitted an error, corrected course, and properly clarified the federal 
law of takings.
302
 The Washington State Supreme Court should likewise 
examine its twenty-year-old takings analysis, concede its now-evident 
flaws, and correct course by adopting the federal analysis. Only then will 
Washington’s citizens, attorneys, and judges extricate themselves from a 
needless takings quagmire. 
 
                                                      
301. Stop the Beach Renourishment, Inc. v. Fla. Dep’t of Envtl. Prot., ___ U.S. ___, 130 S. Ct. 
2592, 2601 (2010). As support for that statement, the U.S. Supreme Court cited cases in which it 
found takings where military aircraft flew so low over property as to render it uninhabitable, United 
States v. Causby, 328 U.S. 256, 261–62 (1946), and where a dam flooded property, Pumpelly v. 
Green Bay Co., 80 U.S. (13 Wall.) 166, 177–78 (1871).  
302. Lingle v. Chevron U.S.A., Inc., 544 U.S. 528, 548 (2005). For a discussion of Lingle, see 
supra text accompanying notes 20–31. 
